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Abstract:    This study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms 
of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ 
in ways that suggest a difference between management’s internal assessment and the market’s 
assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the announcement, notably 
in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private placements experience 
an unfavourable pre-announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after 
the event. Convertible bond issues generate positive excess returns consistent with the market’s 
confidence that they can help to align management and shareholders’ interests.  Further 
investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to the issuer and issue by 
reference to the period immediately surrounding the issue. Specifically, ownership 
concentration, agency matters connected with equity offerings, investor protection connected 
with fund allocation and security pricing, and the influence of powerful moneyed interests 
together provide an instructive insight into market reaction. Institutional inefficiency pertaining 
to underwriting, auditing, analysts’ forecasts and credit ratings are found to have a weak 
association with market price, consistent with due public scepticism concerning management 
and their gatekeepers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical studies have examined the firm’s financing decisions and the corresponding market 
price movements. Differences in price behaviour appear mainly to depend on the available 
information pertaining to forms of financing and the perceptions of the market with respect to 
the firm’s financing decision (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Within the body of theory, several 
studies have considered the market implications of security issues to new as opposed to existing 
investors, and also the types of issues that are subject to different degrees of regulatory 
discipline, obligations and incentives (Baker and Wurgler, 2000; Carlson et al., 2006; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2010; Silva and Bilinski, 2015; Hovakimian and Hu, 2016).  
     Information asymmetries impinge forcefully in terms of the signals conveyed when 
securities are issued.  The theory of information asymmetries posits that if managers seek to 
maximize their existing shareholders’ wealth, shares will be offered to the existing owners only 
when the management believe that the firm’s equity is undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Jenter et al., 2011).  The price pressure hypothesis suggests that an unexpected equity issue 
may also drive down the price by signalling that the firm must make up for a shortfall in 
unobservable cash flow from operations (Fama and French, 2006; Slovin et al., 2000; Intintoli 
and Kahle, 2010).  The wealth transfer hypothesis proposes that an unexpected issue of equity 
reduces the risk of the firm’s outstanding debt leading to a wealth transfer from shareholders 
to bondholders with a net value loss for shareholders (Masulis, 1983; Elliott et al., 2009). The 
above foci of discussion have helped to generate interest in the comparative market reaction to 
the different forms of security issuance (e.g., Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
     In the case of open offers, a management which favours existing shareholders over new 
potential shareholders has an incentive to issue equity when shares are overvalued, especially 
when the firm goes public in a hot market (Gomes, 2001; Alti, 2006).  Issuing new shares 
increases the number of outsider shares, diluting the ownership stake and aggravating the 
potential conflict between managers and outside investors, and thereby constraining firm value 
accordingly (Ginglinger et al., 2012).  These impacts are less likely to occur if ownership is 
already highly concentrated (Slovin et al., 2000; Holderness, 2009). 
In contrast to open offers, private placements are typically offered to a group of sophisticated 
investors whose certification amounts to a positive signal by way of a quality seal (Wruck, 
1989; Chakraborty and Gantchev, 2013), mitigating undervaluation problems, and averting the 
negative signals of public offerings (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wang, 2012).  They may, 
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however, be vulnerable to agency problems associated with ownership concentration especially 
when ownership is already low (Wruck, 1989).   
In the case of rights issues, take-up can guard against ownership dilution or wealth transfer 
to new shareholders.  Hence, rights issues circumvent the agency costs associated with open 
offerings by mitigating the impact of asymmetric information problems and lowering 
transaction costs (Miller and Rock, 1985; Fama and French, 2006; Attig et al., 2006).   
Unlike the securities discussed above, convertible bonds entail contractual disciplines and 
constraints.  These can serve to allay market concerns that arise in respect of other forms of 
issuance, militating against asset substitution and adverse selection problems associated with 
plain equity sales (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 1992).  
     Empirical evidence on price effects of equity issues was seminally analysed by Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). Subsequently, a number of other 
studies have extensively examined mature markets such as the US (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Henry 
and Koski, 2010; Alti and Sulaeman, 2012; Bradley and Yuan, 2013), the UK (Slovin et al., 
2000; Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011; Iqbal, Akbar and Shiwakoti, 2013; Armitage, Dionysiou 
and Gonzalez, 2014; Silva and Bilinski, 2015), France (Ginglinger et al., 2012), Spain (Martín‐
Ugedo, 2003; Alvarez and Gonzalez, 2005), Japan (Suzuki and Yamada, 2012), Australia 
(Lamberto and Rath, 2010), and others.  Most of the recent studies in this area of research have 
been encouraged to a large extent by the increased interest in equity issues worldwide. It has 
been argued that reduced transaction costs and the globalisation of finance have encouraged 
firms to acquire equity finance in global financial markets (Kim and Weisbach, 2008). 
Research interest has been further stimulated by recent periods of the marked unpopularity of 
equity issues. This has occurred notably since 2000 both in the US and in Europe due, inter 
alia, to a tendency to favour merger as a means of rapid growth, and also because of low market 
valuation of companies after the collapse of the technology bubble and an increasingly onerous 
burden of regulation (Craig et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2013). 
     In recent years, security issuance in emerging markets has also attracted research attention 
(e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Cheng, Cheung and Tse, 2006; Ahmad-Zaluki 
et al., 2007; Chen and Wang, 2007; Luo, Rao and Yue, 2010).  Findings differ distinctly across 
markets as well as overall between emerging and mature settings, especially when marked 
differences exist in respect of institutional and operational arrangements. These differences 
engender issues based on reputation, relationships and public policy in supporting financing 
channels particularly when market maturity is an aspiration (Allen et al., 2005).  China is a 
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notable example here, due to its global importance and the evolving nature of its capital 
markets. 
    The salient characteristics of security issuance in China are consonant with the country’s 
evolving social, economic, and market status as well as the pervading presence of powerful 
influential groups.  The research takes due cognisance of important cultural influences which 
impinge on market mechanisms. All note agency problems consistent with an underdeveloped 
institutional infrastructure that is deficient in safeguards against informational asymmetries 
leading to security mispricing, the deliberate distortion of earnings, and the manipulation of 
the dividend profile in the period immediately surrounding security offerings.  These abuses 
can operate to the detriment of minority investors and other outsiders.  For instance, in the case 
of rights issues and open offers, the influence of agency costs associated with state ownership 
comes to bear (e.g., Shen and Xiao, 2001).  In the case of private placements, there are clearly 
visible signs of both manipulation of issue price in the run-up to the issue by the dominant 
controlling shareholders and also a propensity to post-issue overinvestment (e.g., Yu, 2006). 
     While acknowledging the progress of the literature on security issuance, there remains scope 
for a further investigation and comparison of the distinct influences that come into play 
different methods of issuance.  Early work typically focuses on a single method of issuance for 
predicting market movements following the announcement without exploring the relative 
implications of a range of issuance methods for investors.  A number of studies  explore specific 
types of issue, for instance open offers (e.g., Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006), 
rights offers (e.g., Martín‐Ugedo, 2003), private placements (e.g., Barclay et al., 2007), and 
convertible bonds (e.g., Jong, Dutordoir and Verwijmeren, 2011; Lewis and Verwijmeren, 
2014).  However, these fall short of offering a comparative perspective of the range of influence 
on market price exercised by the different methods of issuance. Control and discipline matters 
should be taken into account, including management’s ex-ante issue motives and decisions 
associated with different methods of issuance.  
     Earlier studies tend to confine themselves to a somewhat limited set of determinants.  They 
give insufficient weight, if any, to the characteristics and perspectives of an issue, issuer and 
investors (e.g., Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Rantapuska and Knupfer, 2008).  It is necessary 
to acquiesce in a wide and inter-connected range of factors, paying due attention to the nature 
of the issue itself, the financial characteristics and outlook of the issuer, and the features 
specific to each type of security issuance. 
     Our analytic design differs significantly from previous studies. We provide fresh insights 
by extending previous work concerned with market price movement surrounding a single type 
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of seasoned issuance to an examination of all four types of seasoned issuance in China.  
Through our study, we seek to produce insights into an emerging market’s progress towards 
greater efficiency and completeness as well as into factors that both advance and retard such 
progress.  With respect to the context of seasoned issuance, we consider the extent to which 
the activities of influential market monitors and financial infrastructure builders are reflected 
in market reaction.   
     The above account of the scope of our work leads to the following formal research 
questions: (1) how does the market react to the different forms of seasoned issues?; and (2) 
which factors most powerfully explain the reactions which we observe? 
     In approaching our research questions, we firstly examine how the market reacts across the 
range of methods of seasoned issuance and their potential determinants by reference to 1,810 
seasoned issues in China from 1991 to 2010 inclusive.  We explore the relative impact of open 
offers, rights issues, private placements, and convertible bond issues and compare the 
demonstrated preferences of new as opposed to existing investors.  We also compare 
distinguishing influences that have a bearing on individual features of different forms of 
issuance which are subject to more as opposed to less regulatory discipline, obligations and 
incentives.  Our comparison enables us to observe the play of agency influences in a 
marketplace whose imperfections provide fertile soil for such influences. 
     Secondly, our study examines a range of factors that  explore ex ante metrics determining 
the market’s perception about the value of the new issue, the issue-related features driving 
idiosyncratic market reactions surrounding the announcement period, and those security-
specific characteristics associated with individual forms of issuance which promise to illumine 
operational arrangements, including management and monitoring matters. 
    Thirdly, we elected to study security issuance with reference to China. This decision was 
prompted by the fact that China is an emerging economy of global importance whose financial 
markets are permeated with a particularly large, complex and intriguing body of informational 
asymmetry problems.  Publicly listed firms in China have long experienced the consequences 
of dual classes of shareholding, unclearly defined property rights, and a lack of legal protection 
of minority shareholders’ rights. Participants in the market include rent-seeking local 
governments, predatory corporations and dominant shareholders intent on pulling in money 
and misallocating funds ex post by various devices, notably in the form of related-party 
transactions directed at transferring wealth from minority shareholders to the dominant 
shareholders and the parent company (Aharony et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013). Further, 
disclosure is far less comprehensive in China than in more mature markets. The resulting 
challenge extends to many aspects of financing.  For instance, Dedman et al. (2015) in their 
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study of dividend policy well recognise the contentious problems presented by China’s market, 
with its limited transparency.  
     Our findings give us four fresh insights. First, we observe a negative reaction to both open 
offers and notably rights issues when the issue is announced.  Plain equity financing entails 
adverse-selection costs associated with the perceived unreliability of the underlying assets.  
Further, contrary to the certification argument, the unfavourable reaction received in the case 
of private placements in the pre-announcement period is consistent with outside minorities’ 
anticipation of exploitation in the form of price manipulation by the dominant controlling 
shareholders.  In the post-announcement period, the market is reassured by the strategic 
deployment of assets or cash by targeted investors.  In the convertible bond case, the market’s 
reaction is consistent with its opinion that a convertible can align management and 
shareholders’ interests especially when backed by powerful regulation.  Second, we find that 
ex ante measures which reflect the market’s pre-announcement predictions of the value of the 
new issue - manifested in growth opportunities, price run-up and dividend distribution policy 
–  feature significantly among the factors which are specific to the issuer and the type of 
security issuance. Within this overall set of findings, ownership concentration causes value 
losses in the offerings of equity where agency problems are predominant, but such problems 
impinge less in the case of convertible bond issues, due to both inherent disciplines and 
stringent regulation of convertible bonds in China.  Third, within the market mechanisms 
related to the issue, including underwriting, auditing and analysts, there arise agency matters 
in the period surrounding the announcement. Weak protection of shareholders appears in the 
form of security mispricing and market inefficiency in the provision of information to 
shareholders. These factors powerfully explain the different market reactions.  We find 
particularly instructive evidence of the significance of the intended use of issue proceeds most 
notably when these proceeds are committed to high-tech projects or projects which otherwise 
increase the real asset base. Fourth, with respect to features specific to the type of security, our 
study reveals that investors are vulnerable to misbehaviour associated with exploitative 
renunciations in the case of rights issues, price manipulation by controlling shareholders in the 
case of private placements, and ratings with limited signalling value in the case of convertible 
bonds.  
     We contribute to the literature in two respects.  By addressing comparatively the range of 
methods of seasoned issues, we identify how far distinct features of individual types of issuance 
appear to influence market reaction. A contribution of this different approach is its basis that 
seasoned offerings differ in terms of market transparency and the efficacy of regulations and 
public credulity, thereby shaping the market perception of each individual issuance and 
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accounting for the observed differences in market price movements.  Further, by analysing 
individually important determinants of market reaction for each issue and by relating these to 
investors and to the market as a whole, we produce new evidence of how far both informational 
asymmetries and free cash flow agency problems germane to security issuance determine 
differential market reactions. We suggest how dysfunctional misbehaviour at both the 
institutional and individual levels can be effectively controlled and governed by explicit and 
implicit disciplines in the context of a non-perfect market such as China.  Our empirical 
analyses provide a more realistic view of how the market, issuers and investors interact in the 
issuing process, and hence identify new implications for capital market regulators and 
participants. 
     The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses security issuance 
and the institutional background in China. Section 3 sets out and discusses the methodology 
and develops the hypotheses.  Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes 
and provides policy implications. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
With the establishment of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1991, Chinese 
firms gained an additional financing channel, and equity finance has since become the main 
instrument for firms seeking new funds.  Chinese firms intending to undertake a seasoned issue 
of securities can essentially choose among rights issues, open offers, private placements, and 
convertible bonds under the existing regulation. 
(i) Rights Issues 
A distinctive feature of rights issues is that they have the power to maintain ownership balance.  
This feature influenced China’s government to introduce rights issues in 1992 as a seminal 
substantive step.  However, China differs from virtually every other market with respect to the 
renunciation of rights.  In the U.S., the proceeds of renounced rights are distributed to 
shareholders by managers of the issue. In the UK, entitlements that are renounced are 
commonly placed with an intermediary or directly with other investors.  The transfer of rights 
was allowed in China during the period 2000 to 2001, but soon scrapped due to improper 
trading in the secondary market, which severely damaged investors’ confidence.   
     Rights issues are subject to distinctive regulation whereby issuing firms are required to meet 
three basic accounting criteria set out by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  
First, in terms of profitability, there must normally be a record of the certified net profit for 
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three consecutive years and average return on equity (ROE) of no less than 10 percent.  Second, 
in terms of issue size and frequency of issuance, the number of new shares is strictly limited to 
30 percent of the firm’s existing share capital in the year prior to the issuing year, and two 
consecutive offerings cannot be made in two consecutive accounting periods. A third criterion 
makes offerings subject to best-effort agreement. However, there is no restriction on the 
discount on the subscription price and the benchmarking date for pricing. 
     Rights issues in China also differ from the case of mature markets, where rights issues are 
frequently used to reduce gearing, especially when bad times generate over-borrowing. In 
China, rights issuers frequently pay scant attention to the optimal corporate capital structure 
and accountability to shareholders (Liu et al., 2013).  Ownership of companies is dominated 
by the state, resulting in a capital market that is under the tight control of the government with 
state ownership accounting for more than 60 percent. Ownership dilution is accordingly 
relatively less important than in conventional mature markets. The state-controlling 
shareholders frequently propose rights offers, but opt later to give up the pre-emptive rights or 
not fully subscribing their rights. Minority shareholders who are hard put to prevent an issue 
suffer to the extent that part of the funds raised tends to be dysfunctionally deployed rather than 
being invested in beneficial projects (Shleifer, 1998). Further, rights are usually sold at a 
discount in favour of state shareholders with a controlling stake to the detriment of minority 
shareholders.  These factors combine to cause loss of value for public shareholders, thereby 
impairing public trust.   
 
(ii) Open Offers  
Open offers were initiated in 1994 on an experimental basis.  As compared to rights issues, 
open offers to the general public and institutions are subject to less strict issue criteria.  The 
CSRC requires a record of the certified net profit for three years preceding the issuance with 
an average ROE of at least 6 percent.  In particular, there is no restriction on the quantity of 
cash which can be raised in a single issue.  As a consequence, open offers have become greater 
in value than rights issues. Table A1 shows that open offers became increasingly popular from 
2000 until 2008, when the share-split structure reform had been completed. 
     With respect to pricing, the subscription price in open offers must not be discounted by more 
than the average market price of 20 trading days prior to the benchmarking day or the average 
market price of the last day prior to the announcement of the letter of intent. This guards against 
issuing artificially and manipulatively priced holdings to powerful applicants, some of whom 
are able to access loans from connected sources.  In an evolving market that aspires to gain a 
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reputation for order and stability, substantial intentional discounting would undesirably lead to 
speculative and insider stagging opportunities, and published flotation information would be 
discredited as a consequence. 
     The issue requirements have been subject to frequent revision by the CSRC. Although the 
CSRC later tightened the issue criteria, including the restriction on issue size, these criteria 
remain less restrictive than those applied to rights issues. Hence open offers are vulnerable and 
lend themselves to manipulation for the purpose of raising large amounts of discretionary cash.  
Funds drawn from the market are maliciously pooled and channelled into projects that bear 
little or no relation to the destination set forth in the prospectus – sometimes into fake or 
fictitious investments.  Some projects, even though bearing managerial approval, fall victim to 
uneconomic issue costs and market underperformance (Liu et al., 2013). 
(iii) Convertible Bond Issues 
Convertible bonds were formally introduced in 1998. The authorities administer them and their 
regulation is markedly strict.  The CSRC stipulates that (1) the minimum issue amount should 
be 100 million yuan; (2) total debt balance should not exceed 40 percent of the firm's net assets; 
(3) net assets should be no less than 2.5 billion yuan; and (4) the firm must have maintained a 
record of positive profitability with an ROE of no less than 10 percent for three consecutive 
years. Initially, convertible bond issues were confined to state-owned enterprises that meet the 
criteria with respect to the minimum issue amount, ROE, profitability, total assets and debt-
equity ratio. Preference was afforded to firms operating in the fields of energy, raw materials, 
and infrastructure as well as to key national enterprises.  In 2001, permission to issue 
convertible bonds was extended from state-owned enterprises to all listed firms, together with 
additional stringent criteria on capital adequacy and guarantees: the issuer must have 
guarantors with joint and several liability or an asset-backed pledge; issuers shall have 
convertible bonds rated initially at the time of issue and thereafter annually by a qualified credit 
rating agency.  This finally became a requirement for all issues in 2006.  Due to these 
restrictions, convertible bonds are confined to large issues by creditable companies. 
     Despite strict regulation aimed at governing and ensuring quality and credibility of issuers, 
abuses of process can and do arise in the form of the same personal, uneconomic “money 
collecting”, which already exists in open offers and rights issues.1 Thus, convertible bond 
                                                 
1.   Largely encouraged by the Chinese Government’s policy in support of stock market expansion and the less demanding 
issue criteria introduced in 2006, an increasing number of firms developed ambitious plans to raise new funds at the 
beginning of 2008. Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd., which is the second largest insurer in China, 
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issues must be monitored by regulators to prevent dysfunctional discretionary behaviour on the 
part of management. 
 
(iv) Private Placements 
Private placements were only introduced in 2005 at the time of the launch of the share-split 
structure reform. They are confined either to a group of controlling shareholders or to 
institutional shareholders with a view to restructuring assets or obtaining fresh cash for 
investment to facilitate the process of state-ownership restructuring.  The accounting-based 
regulations on private placements are less strict than those associated with any other methods 
of issuance in terms of financial performance and audited reports.  The CSRC only requires a 
record of net profit for one year preceding the issuance, according to Measures for the 
Administration of Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies (2006), and the Interim 
Measures for Supervision and Management/Administration of Private Placements (2014).  This 
is far below the requirements laid down for offers to existing shareholders or to general public.  
There are no restrictions on the subscription quotas for investors, and greater flexibility 
regarding the choice of benchmarking dates for the subscription price, board meetings, 
shareholder applications and the process of issuance.  In addition, there are no mandatory 
requirements concerning dividend record or post-issue operational performance, as is the case 
for other methods of issuance.  This lenient regulation has encouraged issues by firms seeking 
to inject sound assets through mergers and acquisitions, or issues by firms with poor 
performance, or that are under threat of failure and so in need of strategic cash.  Private 
placements quickly became the most widely-used financing vehicle for raising equity capital. 
As shown in Table A1, private placements are implemented far more frequently and in larger 
volume than any other methods of issuance. 
     The accounting regulations, however, require that the subscription price must not be below 
90 percent of the average market price in the 20 trading days prior to the benchmark day.  
Placements for the purpose of company reorganisation must be at no less than the average 
                                                 
announced its intention to raise 160 billion Yuan through the issuance of 1.2 billion new shares and 41.2 billion Yuan 
convertible bonds in January 2008. This was claimed to be one of the world’s largest ever issues of this type of security. 
Following their example, 43 firms unveiled issue packages totalling 204.3 billion Yuan in a single month. This high 
frequency unnerved investors who feared corporate exploitation of the government’s policy by seizing more money. 
Investors dumped the shares of these firms amid panic selling, triggering a plunge in the stock market. The Shanghai 
Composite Index dropped by 17 percent within 10 trading days following the announcements. The spate of issue plans 
was dubbed “SEOgate”―the worst episode of “pulling money from the market” witnessed in China since 1992 (Tan, 
2008). This destroyed investors’ confidence almost irreparably. In order to rectify this situation, in 2008, the CSRC issued 
a series of regulations to improve information disclosure, strengthen the implementation of the legal responsibilities of the 
parties concerned, ensure the continuation of the dividend distribution system and reform the sponsorship system to 
safeguard shareholders’ interests. 
10 
 
market price in the 20 trading days before the record date.  Unlike in mature markets where 
purchasing firms typically comprise arm’s length collective investors, purchasers in China 
normally comprise the controlling shareholders or the parent company of the issuing firm.  It 
is commonly observed that private placement shares are sold at a premium to institutional 
investors but at a discount to the controlling shareholders and the parent company (Wu et al., 
2010).  The certification effect associated with private placements in mature markets may 
accordingly not hold for China’s market, since the allocation to the controllers and the parent 
could offset the benefit of any certification effect (Slovin et al., 2000).  Furthermore, the 
absence of a strict benchmark date is often accompanied by insider trading and the transfer of 
benefits from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders (Yu, 2006).  
    It is clear from the above discussion that the institutional context of China differs from 
mature, more efficient markets with respect to the motivation, initiation, management and 
monitoring of security offerings and the resulting interactions among regulators and players in 
the market. In particular, in the case of rights offering, the issuers are predominantly state-
owned.  The largest shareholders typically initiate rights offerings, but opt to give up the pre-
emptive rights or do not fully subscribe to their rights.  Opportunistically available cash is often 
harvested without serious consideration of prospective returns or is channelled into related-
party transactions, and investors in many cases register their concern by making a poor 
response to the issue.  Open offers frequently exploit timing opportunities and are accompanied 
by personal activities that depart from shareholder wealth maximisation.  Issuers alter the usage 
of proceeds from that specified in the prospectus, and proceeds may be deployed non-
productively (Liu et al., 2013).  Private placements are commonly linked to controlling 
shareholders’ entrenched positions to the detriment of minority shareholders.  The management 
attempt to cut the costs of purchasing new shares for the controlling shareholders by timing 
and manipulating listing suspension prior to the placement announcement (Wu et al., 2010).  
Convertible bonds are subject to strict accounting regulation and public scrutiny. However, to 
a lesser extent than other forms of issuance, they remain vulnerable to becoming routes to 
personal, uneconomic “money collecting”. 
     In an attempt to rein in abuses of the issue process and other rent-seeking behaviours 
associated with fundraising, the government has introduced a series of accounting-based 
security regulations and policies since 1994, and the new regulations have helped to curb 
money collecting and selection problems (Chen and Wang, 2007). Nevertheless, these 
regulations do not invariably carry the full force of law.  Their moral authority is under constant 
challenge, such that violations are common and the perpetrator may suffer as a result of future 
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incredulity on the part of the market (Liu et al., 2013).  Although the Securities Law and 
Company Law have enacted sanctions against wrongdoing, these are not clearly defined in the 
ordinances.  The weak and inefficient regulatory institutions and market environment further 
hinder the enforcement of laws and regulations.  Between 1994 and 2006, the CSRC listings 
rules were revised ten times in an attempt to prevent abuses of the issue process and rent-
seeking behaviours referred to above.  Nevertheless, controlling shareholders and parent 
companies continue to embezzle subsidiaries’ funds by raising equity by means of seasoned 
issuance, to the detriment of minority shareholders.  Under an incomplete mechanism for 
shareholder meetings, it remains difficult for minority shareholders to monitor the extent to 
which funds are deployed for the benefit of firm value. 
     In summary, financing misbehaviour is rooted in the state-controlled ownership structure, 
ineffective legal protection for minority shareholders, weak supervisory institutions, and a 
predilection among certain private investors for short-term irrational gambling on shares.  
Furthermore, regulatory weakness and informational opacity together increase the risk of the 
misallocation of funds.  Results are manipulated and under-reported in the personal interests of 
promoters and intermediaries who are able to exert effective pressure to bear, even on 
supervisory bodies, including auditors. A particular dysfunctional impact of these 
imperfections is to undermine trust in the market by deterring long-term, sophisticated 
institutional and international investors on whom the market’s future success depends.   
  
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
(i) Data and Sample Selection 
We analyse 1,810 registered seasoned issues conducted by domestic companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 1991 and 2010 inclusive. 
We collect information regarding seasoned issues from the Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Database and China’s Bond Market Database. We obtain other data for Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) analysis and multiple variable analysis from China’s Stock Market Database 
and the Accounting Research Database.2  The intended use of proceeds as stated at the time of 
the announcement is derived from the Wind Financial Terminal and checked in the official 
newspaper, China Securities Times.  We include all firms that have been delisted from the stock 
                                                 
2.  These databases have been developed by the Centre for China Financial Research of the University of Hong Kong and by 
Guo Tai An Information Technology Ltd. 
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exchanges to avoid survival bias, but exclude any firm with a seasoned offering that does not 
have a CSRC report of the filing or of an announcement of intention to issue.  To avoid 
information contamination by other simultaneous corporate events, we exclude certain events 
occurring within 20 days either side of the announcement of the issue.  Such potentially 
confounding events include the annual report, interim report, corporate restructuring, merger 
and takeover bids, earnings reports, dividends, stock splits, market buybacks, and suspension 
or delisting from the official listing.   After screening for such confounding events, the final 
sample consists of 1,659 seasoned issues, comprising 974 rights issues, 239 open offers, 375 
private placements and 71 convertible bond issues. 
     To examine how the market interprets the various types of seasoned issue announcement, 
the issuing firms are disaggregated into open offer firms (OO-firms), private placement firms 
(PP-firms), rights issue firms (RI-firms), and firms issuing convertible bonds (CV-firms).  This 
grouping enables us to examine significant differences such as those implied by the Myers and 
Majluf (1984) signalling-based model concerning issues to new as opposed to existing 
investors as well as issues to public as opposed to targeted investors. The grouping further 
enables us to examine differences such as those implied by agency debate concerning the 
distinguishing features of plain equity issues and issues in the context of convertible bonds. 
     The theoretical discussion in the literature and the distinctiveness of security issuance in the 
case of China, as discussed, lead us to the expectation that the market will react negatively to 
rights issues and open offers. It is expected that private placements will likewise result in a 
negative reaction in the period leading up to the announcement owing to the agency costs which 
result from price manipulation through the power of self-seeking controlling shareholders.  A 
positive reaction may follow the announcement as the market is reassured by the quality of 
strategic investment by targeted investors. In the case of convertible bond issues, we expect a 
positive reaction to the extent that the market anticipates the benefits of strict regulation and 
contractual discipline. 
 
(ii) Events Study Methods   
 
We adopt a modified risk-adjusted market model to examine the impact of the four types of 
issue announcement on short-term market price movement.  We use the value-weighted 
Composite Index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the market return for the 
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companies listed on the respective stock exchanges.  We define the issue announcement date 
for each type of issuance according to the CSRC regulatory requirements.  For rights issues 
and open offers, the announcement dates correspond to the first public announcements of the 
intention to raise equity capital by way of rights and open offers.  Under the CSRC listing 
requirements, an issuer is required to announce promptly both its intention to make an issue 
and its chosen method of issuance.  For private placements, the announcement date corresponds 
to the announcement of the board meeting date.  For convertible bonds, the announcement date 
is deemed to be the date of the publication of the issue. The daily risk-adjusted abnormal return 
(AR) is calculated as follows: 
)( ,,, tmiititi RRAR                                (1) 
where tiAR ,  is the abnormal return on stock i on day t; Ri,t is the daily actual or realised stock 
return adjusted for reinvested cash dividends; Rm.t is the daily value-weighted market returns 
with cash dividends reinvested on the index of the stock exchange where the issuing firm is 
listed; and t is the number of days that elapse before (–) or after (+) the issue is announced.  
The coefficients, i  and i , are ordinary least squares estimates of the intercept and the slope 
for stock i.  We estimate the model coefficients using 240 daily stock return observations 
starting from 300 to 61 days prior to the issue announcement date as defined for each type of 
issuance. The Ri represents a theoretical value growth of a stock holding over a specified period, 
assuming that all dividends are re-invested to purchase additional stocks at the price on the ex-
dividend day. 
    Further, we construct the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the sum of the abnormal 
returns over the event window around the announcement date.  Abnormal returns are generated 
for the five-day event window: two days before the announcement date to two days after it [–
2, +2].  This period is considered to be sufficiently long to compensate for any major delayed 
responses after the announcement date, while being sufficiently short to minimise the number 
of confounding events.  We have conducted tests for various event windows including two, 
three, five and ten days surrounding the announcement period. The results show that the five-
day event window has the highest t-statistic value (see Table 2).  Hence, we report results for 
the five-day event window.  Event period CARs are thus computed as: 



T
t
titi ARCAR
1
,,                                (2) 
where tiCAR ,  
is the cumulative abnormal return of share i from date t to date T. 
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    We construct reference portfolios in addition to a market portfolio as a benchmark for 
calculating abnormal returns. We construct the reference portfolios with firm size and M/B 
ratio based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.  For a given year, size is the 
annual reported market value, and M/B ratio is the annual reported market-to-book ratio.  To 
construct the reference portfolios in year t, we first divide the firms into two groups according 
to the firm’s market capitalisation (size ranking). Each group is then divided into three 
subgroups according to the M/B ratio (value ranking).  We then calculate the average annual 
return of each subgroup.  SMB and HML are calculated as "small cap minus big" and "high 
B/M minus low" to measure the historic excess returns of small size caps and "value" stocks 
over the market as a whole. 
    To test the significance of tiAR ,  and tiCAR , , we compute the standardised residual t-test 
(SRT) based on Bohren et al. (1997).  We employ standardised abnormal returns to prevent 
AR and CAR with large variances dominating the test. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
(i) Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis 
Table 1 reports daily abnormal returns (ARs) surrounding the announcement for the four types 
of seasoned offerings.  Distinctive price adjustment patterns emerge.  For rights issues, the 
daily abnormal returns are negative in the interquartile range (the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile) of –0.14% to –0.06% prior to the announcement. The decision to announce a rights 
offering after a period of significant and negative market returns signals the market’s 
anticipation of the activities of the dominant controlling shareholders whose primary intention 
is to collect cash from the market with little intention of taking up their rights.  This market 
expectation triggers significant negative price reactions accordingly. 
     Upon the announcement, the price drops by 0.50% to –0.63%.  The dominant or otherwise 
influential shareholders habitually surrender their subscription rights after the issue 
announcement with a renunciation rate reaching 90.76% as shown in Table 4. The price drop 
confirms the prior-market anticipation of cash-siphoning behaviour on the part of self-serving 
controlling shareholders.  The daily abnormal returns then remain at the new low level in the 
interquartile range of –0.20% to –0.07%, and it appears to take time for the market to revert to 
its original level.  This lengthy recovery indicates a lack of confidence in the market caused 
by a well–founded anticipation of the commonly observed phenomenon of fund allocation by 
state controllers in the form of related-party transactions and intra-group transfers.  The 
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negative reaction to rights issues in China does not support the conventional wisdom 
concerning managerial opportunism with respect to mispricing achieved by timing the issue 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Rather our results provide evidence of an aversion to a form of 
issuance beset by behaviour which militates against the interests of public subscribers. 
     The market price effects for open offers during the pre-announcement period contrast with 
those for rights issues but similar patterns occur during the post-announcement period.  Open 
offers evince significant upward movements in price in the interquartile range of –0.21% to 
0.43% prior to the announcement.  The price adjustments in advance of the announcement are 
consistent with the timing hypothesis whereby rational managers create new issues when the 
shares appear to be over–priced.  In reality, according to our data, managers have considerable 
flexibility when timing the issue, since 0.91% of the offerings occur after a positive price run-
up over trading days –30 to –2 (not shown).  In response, the market lowers its valuation of 
the shares by 0.98% upon the announcement, and much of the positive announcement effect 
then erodes by way of a subsequent rundown in price.  The daily abnormal returns settle at the 
new low level in the interquartile range of –0.26% to –0.05%.  Such post-announcement 
reactions reflect managerial opportunism and agency influences.  Free cash flow increases 
following equity issues. Opportunities for misdirection and the withdrawal of funds abound.  
Issuers often divert the proceeds sub-optimally away from the use designated in the 
prospectuses without the prior consent of shareholders (Shleifer, 1998; Liu et al., 2013). A 
fund of new, uncommitted resources is bound to be viewed with suspicion, and the issue is 
accordingly received unfavourably. 
     In contrast to open offers, private placements show a downward movement in price prior to 
the announcement in the interquartile range of –0.25% to –0.10%. Targeted investors are 
typically the controlling shareholders, and private placements are accordingly often 
accompanied by price manipulation and insider trading with a view to transferring benefits 
from the public to targeted investors.  The management seek to acquire shares at a low price 
by timing the issue when the price is depressed in favour of the controlling shareholders as 
noted by Wu et al. (2010).  Such favoured investors can then later reap huge financial gains 
from dealings when the price rises.  This opportunism normally occurs immediately prior to 
or on the trading day itself (Wu et al., 2010).  In anticipations, the market reacts with a 
significant, negative response upon the announcement in the form of a 0.11% drop in market 
returns.   
     The market’s post–announcement reaction contrasts with the pre–issue case.  Most notably, 
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the majority of any daily abnormal returns revert to the level quickly and remain positive 
following the announcement.  Firms that conduct private placements in China are usually 
underperforming firms including Special Transfer firms and Particular Transfer firms3 which 
struggle to maintain their level of operations.  Underperforming firms seek an injection of good 
assets by their controlling shareholders or strategic cash by institutional investors.  The 
favourable reaction following the announcement partly reflects relief as the market witnesses 
the replacement of bad assets with good assets and/or the introduction of strategic institutional 
investors.  The reaction can partly be seen as a response to the certification effect associated 
with institutional investment. These together serve to offset concerns about any propensity to 
post-issue overinvestment or related-party transactions.   
     Convertible bond issues experience a spell of positive daily returns in the interquartile range 
of 0.04% to 0.21% prior to the announcement. The issue announcement then precipitates a 
significant market price rise of some 18%.  The share price then remains at the new high level 
following the announcement in the interquartile range of –0.09% to 0.29%.  A convertible is 
an instrument of intrinsically good quality due to its contractual discipline.  Conversion terms 
have the power to signal optimism about future increase in corporate value with the result that 
convertible issues can help to allay the doubts of a more conservative investor habitat. In 
addition, convertible issues in China are subject to strict regulatory criteria, guarantee 
requirements and scrutiny with the result that such issues are typically undertaken by 
financially sound firms.  All of these factors inspire strong market confidence. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
Further insights may be gained by examining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 
various event windows.  These are reported in Table 2.  There is a significant, positive CAR 
over the [–20, –1] window for open offers at the 1% level, whilst the CARs for rights issues 
and private placements are also significant but negative at the 5% level.  The CARs over 
various other windows in the post-announcement periods, namely [+1, +5], [+1, +10] and [+1, 
+20], are significant and negative for open offers mostly at the 5% level and especially for 
rights issues at the 5% level; whereas they are positive for private placements and convertible 
                                                 
3.  The CSRC introduced the delisting system in 1998 for firms that suffer financial or other abnormalities.  A firm is labelled 
as a special transfer (ST) if it sustains losses for two consecutive years and its shares are subject to 5% daily price limit 
movements. If an ST firm fails to become profitable in the third year, its shares are put under particular transfer (PT) and 
suspended from trading on the Main Board. The PT firm will be delisted if it fails to make a profit within six months of its 
suspension. 
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issues with different levels of significance.  The market responses over these events windows 
are consistent with the ARs presented in Table 1, altogether substantiating a distinctive market 
perception of risks and prospects pertaining to each form of issuance in China’s market.  
Further, the average five-day announcement period CAR over the [–2, +2] window is –
1.64% for rights issues and –0.36% for open offers at the 5% level.  Notably, private placements 
evince a positive five-day CAR of 0.08% at the 5% level, even though market returns present 
contrasting pre- and post-issuance patterns.  This suggests that private placements are generally 
regarded as a source of strategic investment, which carries the power to promote the prosperity 
of firms through the injection of good assets and needed cash.  The five-day CAR for 
convertible issues amounts to a significant 1.27%. 
     In summary, our observed differing reactions across the forms of issuance are only partially 
consistent with the empirical evidence for mature markets.  Notably, a U.S. rights issue does 
not trigger a negative price reaction (e.g., Martin-Ugedo, 2003) but we observe a significantly 
negative reaction in our case of China. A convertible issue induces a negative effect in the US 
and UK (e.g., Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999; Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2011), while the 
opposite holds true for China. A private placement announcement conveys a positive signal in 
mature markets (e.g., Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006), but not in the case of 
our findings for Chinese issuers during the pre-announcement period. 
     At the same time, our results share common ground with the implications of the information 
asymmetric hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis.  Managers attempt to exploit mispricing 
opportunities and investors tend to infer that the firm is overpriced when an open offering is 
announced, as per Myers and Majluf (1984).  The unfavourable market reactions to rights 
issues and private placements during the pre-announcement period suggest that equity issuance 
is agency-driven.  This impact is mitigated when an issue is supported by protective provisions 
as in convertible issues or by the injection of strategic resources as in private placements during 
the post-announcement period – both being forces which combat agency.  Overall, the negative 
market reactions in plain equity issuance reflect the particularly powerful agency problems, 
which permeate China’s informationally opaque market subject as it is to the activities of 
powerful, personally self–interested and otherwise manipulative investors.  This state of affairs 
accords with our hypotheses, to the effect that the suspicion associated with equity can be 
allayed by the safeguards achievable through convertible bonds. At the same time, it remains 
unclear how far the negative average abnormal returns surrounding the time of the 
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announcement in the case of open offers and rights issues are related to the information 
contained in a range of potential determinants.  Likewise, we ask what best explains the 
contrasting market reaction in the case of convertible bond issues.  We further ask why market 
price behaves distinctively in private placements.  The above observations and discussion 
substantiate the case for further exploration. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
(ii) Multiple Variable Analysis  
(1) Hypothesis Development 
Our empirical results presented above clearly suggest the existence of distinct market responses 
to the issue announcement.  In order to pursue the observed differences, we estimate multiple 
variable regression models to explore the relative contribution of three sets of variables to 
market returns for different forms of seasoned offerings.  The variables are designed to 
represent: characteristics of issuers to capture pre-issue inter-firm variability; characteristics of 
individual issues before and immediately after the announcement; and features specific to the 
individual type of security.  We use the five-day CAR: two days before the announcement date 
to two days after it [–2, +2], as the dependent variable.  Our variables are described below and 
formally set out in Table 3. 
Pre–issue features:    Research evidence suggests that the pre-issue features of issuing firms 
are crucial in determining the market’s perception of the value of the new issue (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Barnes and Walker, 2006). We accordingly consider the pre-issue market-to-book 
ratio, earnings forecasts, price run-up, dividend payment, ownership and firm size preceding 
the issuance in the estimation. 
     Market-book ratio (MBpre-issue).  Firms with growth prospects frequently have a high market-
to-book ratio (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004).  High MB is 
commonly associated with dynamism and promise;  hence the risk (Fama and French, 1992). 
In the case of China, there is complementary evidence that a high MB is associated with growth 
as well as the risk of failure (Chen et al., 2007).  An equity issue can fuel latent growth and the 
market’s appraisal of a financing event will reflect this insofar as it is perceptible and credible. 
Whilst following the broad consensus concerning MB, we recognise that in a market with 
limited transparency and a measure of corruption, we must be on the alert when examining our 
results for any signs that a high MB may be influenced by potentially unfavourable factors such 
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as the existence of overvalued growth itself, intangible assets prone to overvaluation, the low 
quality of tangible assets and the impact of accounting conventions including historic cost 
(Pagano and Roell, 1998), or market anomalies associated with cognitive biases and agency 
costs on the part of investors (Lakonishok et al., 1994).  We measure the pre-issue growth 
prospects of the firm using MB, which is defined as the sum of assets plus the market value of 
equity minus the book value of equity, divided by assets, as at the balance sheet date 
immediately prior to the issue announcement. 
     Analysts' forecasts (FCASTDiverg).  The counsel of share analysts may appear at first sight to 
be a means of making abnormal gains.  The market believes that reputable analysts supply 
more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts. Hence, they are able to contribute to 
market efficiency by reducing asymmetric information among market participants, which 
militates against mispricing (Bowen et al., 2008).  At the same time, the agency cost hypothesis 
attributes a favourable bias to analysts derived from conflict of interests.  Biased reports may 
arise from analysts' reliance on lines of communication with corporate executives and/or from 
pressure to favour client companies. From fear of jeopardizing business relationships, analysts 
may be reluctant to make unfavourable recommendations to current or potential client 
companies (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Feng and McVay, 2010).  Such unwillingness appears 
to apply to China.  Analysts in brokerage firms are under intense pressure to gain investment 
banking business and managers put pressure on brokers to refrain from making unfavourable 
recommendations (Ang and Ma, 1999). This causes investors to mistrust earnings forecasts 
published in issue prospectuses.  The resulting hypothesis is that earnings forecasts are 
positively, but weakly, correlated with abnormal returns, regardless of the form of issuance.  
To test market sensitivity to analysts’ forecasts, we use the divergence of analysts’ forecasts, 
FCASTDiverg, measured as the difference between the actual and the forecasted earnings for the 
year when the new issue is undertaken.   
     Price run-up (RUNUP). The timing hypothesis proposes that the management are 
systematically trying to create a wealth transfer from new shareholders to existing shareholders 
(Alti, 2006).  When the firm becomes over-valued, the management recapitalise the firm 
through an equity issue.  The manipulation of price in the run up to an offering is eminently 
feasible in an environment where accounting and auditing standards are flawed (Teoh et al., 
1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).  In response, the stock market reacts 
negatively to the issue announcement, which tends to be followed by periods of negative 
returns.  Hypothesising that the reaction depends on both the implications for cash flows and 
the degree of surprise, we examine market timing across the four types of issue using RUNUP, 
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which is measured as the market-adjusted abnormal returns over the 180-day window (event 
days –181 to –1)  using the value-weighted market index as a benchmark.  
     Dividend payment (DIV).  The role of dividends as a driver of shareholder value has been 
subject to controversy over recent decades. Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959) formalise the 
popular, traditional position that dividends are a favourable signal which, judiciously managed, 
can improve firm value.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) challenge this traditional position on 
the basis of their exposition of the ideal markets case.  Opponents hold that dividends have a 
negative impact on shareholder value since firms with high dividend payouts have higher 
required rates of return and hence lower share prices, or are economically insignificant 
(Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; Ang and Peterson, 1985). Denis and Osobov (2008) 
provide a cross-country analysis to this effect. Others provide evidence to indicate that 
dividends are highly relevant to share price but in different directions at different times (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2004; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).   
     While the impact of distribution policy on share price remains inconclusive, dividends may 
serve as one of the few available credible signal of financial mobility where market efficiency 
is limited.  However, this may be due to the fact that in China low cash dividend payments are 
very common among listed firms. Those firms that adopt a constant cash dividend policy only 
account for 5.5% (Allen et al., 2005). It is commonly observed that many of them pay stable 
dividends prior to an issue, but soon reduce or even suspend dividend payments once the new 
shares are floated (Fernald and Rogers, 2002).  To curb this malpractice, in 2006 the CSRC 
promulgated the “Management of Cash Dividends by Listed Companies” with a view to 
improving the quality of the distribution system and safeguarding shareholders’ interests.4  
Despite such efforts on the regulator’s part, a dividend may amount to a cash-wasting attempt 
falsely to signal a promise or as a means of shedding uninvestable cash in a time of decline.  
Given the inconclusiveness of the debate concerning dividends and special complications in 
the case of China, it appears to be appropriate to acquiesce in the inconclusiveness of the debate 
rather than hypothesise in one direction. To capture the potential impact of the distinctive, 
albeit irregular, prior-issue payment decision, as opposed to the post-issue dividend payment 
decision, while taking due account of the regulatory requirements, we define dividend 
payments using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm paid a dividend in the two 
                                                 
4.  The CSRC imposed the “Management of Cash Dividends by Listed Companies” in 2006, which stipulates that issuers 
must continue with dividend payments in the two years following the new issue. 
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years prior to the issue, or 0 otherwise.  
     Ownership concentration (Herf3).   Significant changes in ownership structure associated 
with the new issue can  materially affect the value of both the existing and the new investors’ 
stakes in the firm (Kothare, 1997).  The liquidity hypothesis suggests that large block holdings 
can increase the liquidity of their stakes if blockholders subscribe for rights and gain a 
significant portion of new shares (Armitage, 2010).  The corporate control hypothesis proposes 
that blockholders possess greater resources than individual investors and can become better 
informed. They often command dominant voting power, feel more committed to the firm, and, 
hence, have a greater incentive to monitor the issuer (Gul et al., 2010). Such a control structure 
will militate against the incentive to invest issue proceeds in projects which serve private 
interests at the expense of the corporate interest.  Against this, agency theory argues that 
ownership concentration aggravates conflicts notably between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders with voting power.  These conflicts and potential abuses operate 
against a fair market valuation (Slovin et al., 2000). 
     Corporate ownership in China is highly concentrated in the hands of a single investor or a 
group of investors – usually the state itself and state-owned enterprises or institutions holding 
over 60 percent of the voting shares of firms.   This highly concentrated ownership structure 
has led to entrenchment, encroachment, and appropriation on the part of dominant shareholders 
to the detriment of minority shareholders, and firm value is severely underestimated.  This is 
all the more serious because the legal protection of external investors is weak.  It is commonly 
observed that the dominant controllers have a strong incentive and opportunity to seize large 
amounts of cash at their disposal to engage in self-serving expropriation, mostly by means of 
related-party transactions (Liu et al., 2013).  Decisions on seasoned issues cannot therefore be 
dissociated from the pursuit of private benefits by controllers who show scant regard for 
minority shareholders.  Few public shareholders have participated in discussing issue plans at 
the available opportunities to exercise any influence on the issue decision.  The opportunistic 
and vigilant pursuit of self-interest on the part of the most powerful and influential shareholders 
will operate unfavourably.  The foregoing discussion leads to our hypothesis that ownership 
concentration has a negative price effect when a new issue is announced with the strength of 
the effect depending on the extent of investors’ concern.  To test for the significance and 
direction of the influence of ownership concentration on market returns, we employ the 
Herfindahl index to measure ownership concentration by way of the largest three shareholders’ 
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shareholdings within the firm, Herf3, as at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the issue 
announcement. 
     Size of firm (SIZE).  Stocks of small-capitalisation companies tend to be more volatile than 
those of large-capitalisation companies (Jain and Kini, 1999).  In China, a growing tension 
exists between the continued pressure to expand the stock market and the lack of new capital.  
Amid asymmetric information about the small-cap stocks and excessive speculation in the 
secondary market, investors scramble to buy small-cap stocks at a high price even where their 
performance and prospects are distinctly lacklustre, with a view to stagging them for short-
term gains. Trading in the stocks of large-cap companies is less vulnerable to market 
fluctuations and subject to more efficient pricing because their performance tends to be more 
stable and is closely monitored by large, active, sophisticated and credible market participants. 
However, an unfavourable influence arises when the government’s typical retention of direct 
control over many large firms through majority shareholdings encourages managerial 
entrenchments and corporate tunnelling. Such a prospect might well be expected to trigger a 
negative market reaction. Small firms, by contrast, tend to be shielded from government 
ownership, leaving them free to develop their growth potential (Liu and Pang, 2009).  In such 
circumstances, their managers’ interests are more likely to be aligned with those of 
shareholders.  We accordingly hypothesise that market returns are negatively associated with 
firm size. We measure firm size by the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation 
prior to the issue, adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding year. 
Issue characteristics: By way of potentially significant issue characteristics, we consider 
underwriting, auditing, discount in subscription price, offering size, intended use of issue 
proceeds, and change in capital structure following the issuance in the estimation. 
     Discount in subscription price (DISC).  The market efficiency hypothesis suggests that the 
subscription price should be directly related to the disparity between the management’s 
assessment of the firm’s quality and the market’s valuation of the firm (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992; Armitage, 2010).  In an issue where the underwriter expects a lower take-up from 
existing shareholders, underwriters must incur higher investigation costs and hence impose a 
higher issue price discount to protect them from the failure of the offer.  As an alternative to 
underwriting, the issuer can reduce the risk of a failed issue equally effectively by setting a 
sufficiently low offer price relative to the current uninformed market price (Marsh, 1980; 
Slovin et al., 2000). In the presence of information asymmetries, a deep discount issue serves 
as a substitute mechanism for ensuring a full subscription to the offer (Bohren et al., 1997). 
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     Under the CSRC listing rules, the subscription price must be linked to the firm’s market 
price.  To prevent deep discounting and protect shareholders’ interests, the CSRC stipulates 
that the issue price shall not be either below or above the average price for 20 trading days 
prior to a benchmarking date in the cases of open offers, private placements and convertible 
issues, while no benchmarking date is set for rights issues.  In line with the CSRC’s 
benchmarking dates for pricing, the announcement day for rights issues is deemed to be the 
first publication of the firm’s intention to undertake a rights issue.  The announcement day for 
open offers is deemed to be the first publication of the firm’s intention to undertake an open 
offer. The press release date of the decisive board meeting is taken to be the announcement day 
for private placements. The date of the announcement of the issue prospectus is taken as the 
announcement day for convertible issues.  Hence, we define the discount in subscription price, 
DISC, as follows: 
**
20, /)( PPPDISC tsub                             (3) 
where 20, tsubP  is the average closing price for the 20 trading days prior to the issue 
announcement date; and 
*P  is the subscription price for new shares for each individual issue.  
A larger, positive DISC indicates a higher discount, while a negative number indicates 
premiums.  If the market discount is a reflection of the quality of the issuers, then the market 
should respond favourably insofar as the issuer is deemed to be a good-quality issuer, whilst 
the opposite holds for a poor-quality issuer.  Further, if the market interprets rights issues as a 
special offer to state owners, then a relatively lower subscription price in relation to the current 
market price will be viewed unfavourably and interpreted as a value loss connected with 
relation-building and opportunistic undertakings on the part of state owners and other inside 
parties. It is, accordingly, reasonable to formulate our hypotheses for the three cases in 
accordance with the above discussion.    
     In respect of private placements, the discount effect may differ according to the targeted 
investors. To explore this possibility, we distinguish price discount in the case of controlling 
shareholders from that of institutional investors. We hypothesise that there is a significant, 
adverse impact on market returns if target investors are controlling shareholders in accordance 
with agency considerations, but a significant, positive impact if target investors are institutional 
investors in accordance with a certification effect.  To test the significance and direction of the 
distinctive impacts, we include the interaction terms between price discount and the target 
investor, namely DISCBUYERController and DISC BUYERInstitution, in the estimation. 
     Underwriting (UNDER). The signalling model points to the relevance of underwriting to 

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firm attributes. The highest quality firms are expected to prefer an uninsured offer, medium 
quality firms an underwritten offer and the lowest quality firms a full commitment offer 
(Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986). The adverse selection hypothesis suggests that undervalued 
firms will tend to experience higher participation rates and the selection of uninsured issues, 
leading to a positive price reaction.  Low quality firms with an anticipated low participation 
rate opt for a full commitment contract, thus triggering a negative price reaction (Eckbo and 
Masulis,  1992).  An opposing view holds that the highest quality firms would choose an 
insured issue because underwriter certification provides them with a quality seal (Gopalan et 
al., 2011).  
     In China, all new issues, apart from private placements, must be underwritten in line with 
the CSRC regulations. In the case of rights issues, the CSRC requires that an issue be 
underwritten by the best efforts procedure for the sake of quality assurance and in the interests 
of state ownership.  The procedure is mandatory which may reduce the quality assurance effect 
associated with auditing. We accordingly expect a small or zero effect for underwriting.  
Underwriting decisions on open offers, convertible issues and in particular private placements 
are at management’s discretion. Assuming that the market is aware of the implications of this 
situation and the costs of the range of options, our corresponding hypothesis is that there is a 
positive relationship between underwriting and market returns, but that the strength of the 
effect depends on the risk associated with the chosen method. In descending order of the risk 
to which the underwriter is exposed, the methods are full commitment, best efforts and standby.  
We employ three dummy coded variables, UnderFull, UnderBest, and UnderStandby, for the three 
methods. UnderFull takes the value of 1 where an issue is underwritten in full, or 0 otherwise. 
UnderBest takes the value of 1 where an issue is underwritten by best efforts, or 0 otherwise. 
UnderStandby takes the value of 1 where an issue is underwritten by standby, or 0 otherwise.  
      Auditing (AUDIT).  The quality of auditing plays an external monitoring role on behalf of 
shareholders in attesting to the credibility of accounting information produced by management 
(Cohen et al., 2002).  High-quality auditors help to improve the firm’s corporate governance 
and restrain agency problems (Hay and Davis, 2004), whilst low-quality auditors cannot 
effectively exercise the monitoring of clients’ financial reporting processes (Claessens et al., 
2002)  and may be susceptible to coercion.  It is tempting to conclude that a new issue that is 
audited by a notably more prestigious firm sends a favourable signal to the market.  However 
in an emerging, uncertain market with limited transparency, the contrary possibility must be 
recognised and tested not least because sub-contracting to local firms may threaten even a top 
firm’s credibility. In China, all listed firms are required by the CSRC to have their new issues 
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audited by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs).5 An auditor’s commercial relationship with 
its client may cause it to be unduly accommodating and - either locally or worldwide - there 
may arise a conflict of interest between the audit and consultancy roles.  There have been 
several cases in China recently where the credibility of audited figures has been challenged, for 
example, NQ Mobile. Regulators are tightening the rules on short sales in order to contain 
abuses. There is clearly a greater danger with regard to rights issues, open offers and private 
placements that do not share the contractual disciplines of convertible bond issues. Accounting 
standards remain low in practice even though international standards nominally apply, and 
irregularities are widespread. Analysts are also misled in extreme ways such as hiring 
employees and renting inventories in advance of their inspections.  It follows that auditing can 
lead to outcomes which enhance firm value when a top firm conducts a full audit without 
subcontracting, or to outcomes that detract from corporate value when the auditor is deemed 
unreliable, or indeed to neither when the market sets no store by the audit function. We, 
accordingly, hypothesise that an issue benefits from the presence of a top-10 auditor. We define 
a dummy variable, AUDIT, that takes the value of 1 for Top-10 auditors, or 0 for auditors who 
are not within the Top-10 category.6 
     Size of offering (OFFER). The price pressure hypothesis suggests that the market reacts 
negatively to an increase in the supply of shares because an increased supply of shares tends to 
force the share price to drop (Asquith and Mullins Jr., 1986).  According to agency theory, 
issue proceeds are vulnerable to sub-optimal investment deployment as management exercise 
discretion regarding their personal interests even to the extent of threatening corporate survival.  
Furthermore, raised funds may be withdrawn into associated companies in which managers 
have more substantial interests, to the detriment of the deprived firm (Bates et al., 2009; Mann 
and Sicherman, 1991).   
     At the same time, larger issues stand to benefit from more vigilant monitoring, and inspire 
greater market confidence accordingly (Lamberto and Rath, 2006).   In this regard, existing 
research shows a positive association between large issues and large issuers and between large 
projects and high prospective investment opportunities in both the private and public domains 
(Jain and Kini, 1999; Tan et al., 2002).  This argument, however, may not hold for China where 
                                                 
5.  CPAs were originally set up and sponsored by the local governments and institutions in the early 1990s, and have been 
gradually transformed into independent auditors through a series of reforms. CPAs claim to have now adopted international 
accounting and auditing standards and to function accordingly. 
6.  The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) has ranked the Top 100 Chinese audit firms since 2002 
based on their annual revenues as publicised by CICPA.  As the Top–10 ranking is relatively stable, we extend the ranking 
to 1998 in order to maintain our sample size. 
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a larger issue is most likely to be beset with substantial agency costs.  Management appropriate 
cash from the market and direct it into low-yielding investments and tunnelling operations; 
they even alter the usage of proceeds from that specified in the prospectus, deploying proceeds 
non-productively, altogether impairing long-term firm value (Liu et al., 2013).  We, 
accordingly, hypothesise that open offers, rights issues and private placements are particularly 
prone to agency problems due to the ex post utilisation of issue proceeds, leading to a negative 
market reaction. 
     Convertible bonds are subject to strict discipline, which mitigates agency dangers (Stein, 
1992; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007).  Further, in China, firms proposing to issue convertible 
bonds are required by the CSRC to have these rated and reviewed annually in order to account 
for any outlook changes.  The market anticipates effort and disciplined behaviour.  In addition, 
funds raised through convertible issues are often linked with national strategic projects. This is 
likely to extend the scrutiny of the firm. We therefore hypothesise that a convertible issue is 
positively associated with market returns. We define the size of the offering according to the 
type of issuance, OfferRI, OfferOO, OfferPP and OfferCV, which are measured, respectively, as 
the ratio of gross proceeds raised through rights issues, open offers, private placements and 
convertible issues over the firm’s market capitalisation at the accounting year end preceding 
the issue. 
     Intended use of issue proceeds (FUSE). The asymmetric information hypothesis addresses 
new financing events but does not distinguish between the different purposes for which funds 
will be deployed (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). Walker and Yost (2008) document that the 
market reaction depends on the intended use of  issue proceeds.  The CSRC requires that issuers 
publish a detailed statement specifying how acquired proceeds are to be deployed across four 
broad categories. The Wind Financial Terminal provides detailed information for individual 
projects and their corresponding investment amount. We examine all reports for the 1,810 
issues published in the China Securities Times for the period 1992–2010 and ascertain that all 
issuers specify the intended use.  Most issuers stipulate multiple usage.  In such cases, we adopt 
the primary stated application as measured by the largest investment amount.  We then allocate 
each case across four categories, namely, innovation and high–tech projects, general fixed 
investment including the acquisition of other companies, intra-firm investment, and the 
repayment of debt or financing working capital.  
     Our hypotheses follow accordingly. As high-tech projects enhance the firm’s competiveness 
and prospects, and the general fixed investment increases the real asset base of the firm, we 
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hypothesise that both impinge positively on market returns.  By contrast, intra-firm investment 
carries high potential agency costs primarily associated with related-party transactions, and 
hence embodies a negative potential.  The repayment of debt or financing working capital needs 
does not necessarily change the asset structure of the firm, yet such repayment may be harmful 
to the extent that a lower financial leverage reduces the value of any effective corporate tax 
shield and that financing additional working capital needs are equated by the market with a less 
disciplined use of resources by management seeking to shirk their accountabilities. Hence, we 
hypothesise that there is a negative relationship between the repayment of debt and financing 
working capital needs and market returns. We employ four dummy coded variables, FUSETech, 
FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC, for the four intended usage of issue proceeds. FUSETech 
takes the value of 1 for innovation and high-tech projects, or 0 otherwise. FUSEFixed takes the 
value of 1 for general fixed investment, or 0 otherwise.  FUSEIntra takes the value of 1 for intra-
firm investment, or 0 otherwise.  FUSEDWC takes the value of 1 for the repayment of debt or 
financing working capital needs, or 0 otherwise.  
     Change in capital structure (ΔDE): The extent of the vulnerability of equity to agency costs 
depends on the overall capital structure, in the sense that a levered capital structure incorporates 
disciplines which offset equity’s agency costs. Judicious financial leverage helps to ensure that 
operations are conducted in such a way that they will meet contractual obligations (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). An increase in equity is potentially detrimental to existing shareholders to the 
extent that it reduces the risk of the firm's outstanding debt without necessarily adding to the 
value of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This applies even more to the case of China, 
where the decision to issue equity brings into play the prevalent, widespread agency issues 
which beset the market.  The market duly responds unfavourably in the form of negative market 
returns.  We accordingly hypothesise that a negative relationship exists between the ΔDE ratio 
and abnormal market returns surrounding the announcement of the issuance.  We measure the 
change in capital structure by introducing the offering size into Equation (4) in order to relate 
the change in capital structure caused by the amount issued to the overall financial resources 
invested in the firm. 
MV
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EquityDebt
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                                              (4) 
where Debt is the total book value of short term and long term debt; Equity is the gross proceeds 
raised in the new issue; MV is the market value of the firm on day t = –30; and α is the 
proportion of funds proposed by the issuing firm for refinancing existing debt. The market 
value of the issuing firm is the product of the share's closing price on day t = –30 and the total 
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number of outstanding shares prior to the issue (Tan et al., 2002). 
     Security-specific characteristics: Features specific to the security issue itself potentially 
influence the market’s perception about the value of a new issue and can be identified in the 
case of rights issues, private placements and convertible issues.  We account in the estimations 
for take-up in rights issues, targeted buyer in private placements, and credit rating in 
convertible issues.   
      Rights take-up (TAKEUP): The liquidity hypothesis suggests that large block holdings 
narrow the investor base of the firm, causing a liquidity reduction in the firm’s shares which, 
in turn, adds to the price pressure on the shares issued.  However, if they “guarantee” a buy-up 
of a big portion of new shares, large block holdings may lead to increased firm liquidity 
(Kothare, 1997) and reduced ownership dilution or wealth transfer from old to new 
shareholders through the lessening of asymmetric information (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).   
     In China, the largest shareholders fail to take up their rights on a pro-rata basis, but this does 
not threaten their controlling status as they hold an ultimately dominant position in the firm by 
way of a stake exceeding 60 percent.  The management exploit the opportunity to grab money 
from the market as soon as the firm meets the issue criteria, regardless of whether they have 
enough cash to subscribe for the rights. Conflicts of interest between the largest shareholders 
and the uninformed minority shareholders loom large.  This would be expected to drive down 
the share price when the announcement is made.  If the largest shareholders take up the rights, 
the market should respond positively insofar as a lower risk of agency costs will be perceived. 
This is particularly significant in China’s prevailing scenario of conflicting interest, minority 
exploitation and informational opacity. We accordingly hypothesise that there is a positive 
relationship between take-up and market returns.  We define a dummy variable, TAKEUP, that 
takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholders take up the rights, or 0 otherwise. 
     Target buyers in private placements (BUYER): In private placements, the shares are offered 
to selected investors, which are often institutions that may pass them on to the public. Typically 
targeted at institutional investors, private placements benefit from the certification effect 
associated with the standing of the chosen investors (Wruck, 1989; Chakraborty and Gantchev, 
2013). Although the placing price must contain some inducement to subscribe, the 
undervaluation problems associated with the negative signals of open offerings are avoided 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wang, 2012).  An offsetting unfavourable impact may, however, 
arise when a pyramid ownership structure and intra-group cross-holdings produce strong 
incentives for the controlling shareholders to indulge in – as often in China – related-party 
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transactions and overinvestment (Shleifer, 2000). When targeted subscribers include the 
controlling shareholders as applies in China, there is an incentive for management to issue 
shares when they are known to be undervalued in the market. When outside institutional 
investors are being sought, there is a contrary incentive to issue shares when prices are known 
to be high (Wu et al., 2010).  Our corresponding hypothesis is that the market reacts negatively 
if the acquirer of shares is the controlling shareholder but positively if the acquirer is an 
institution. We define a dummy variable, BUYER, that takes the value of 1 if the shares are 
sold to the controlling shareholders, or 0 if they are sold to institutional investors. 
     Rating of convertible issues (RATE):   The asymmetric information hypothesis predicts that 
the price reaction to security offerings depends on the sensitivity of firm value to the change in 
the value of the new securities (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Credit ratings potentially affect share 
price by adding to public information about the creditworthiness of issuers.  In China, the 
CSRC requires that convertible bond issuers have their convertibles rated and arrange follow-
up ratings.  All qualified issues must be rated preferably AA+ and above, but no lower than A–
.  In addition, the criteria are set high in terms of profitability, capital adequacy and guarantees.  
It follows that the usual benefit of rating in a competitive market is reduced owing to the fact 
that the ratings in China tend to be uniformly high as a result of this quality hurdle (Poon and 
Chan, 2008).  Our corresponding hypothesis is that a weak, positive relationship or no 
relationship exists between credit ratings and market returns.  To test the signalling power of 
rating as discussed by Myers and Majluf (1984), we include credit ratings and define a dummy 
variable, RATE, which takes the value of 1 if the convertible is assigned AA+ and above, or 0 
if it is below AA+ but above A–.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
(2) Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 reports the basic characteristics of variables, comparing the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of both the issuers and the issues across the four types of seasoned issuance.  
Prior to issuance, it appears that OO-firms have a higher median MB ratio (1.76) compared to 
RI-firms (1.62) and PP-firms (1.55), while CV-firms evince the lowest level of growth 
opportunities (1.41).  With respect to analysts’ forecasts, it appears that analysts are more 
reserved in the case of rights issues (–0.003%) and private placements (–0.005%), with greater 
divergence regarding cash offers (0.017%), which reflects their perception of the issuer’s 
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prospects and underlying risk–taking in their future operations.7  The run-up in price is highest 
for open offers (0.29), corresponding to the most significant increase in market returns prior to 
the announcement as shown in Table 2, but lowest for private placements at -0.03.  
Furthermore, the majority of issuers – particularly in the case of private placements – pay 
dividends in the two years preceding the proposed issue, which is in line with the CSRC 
requirements.  Firms that conduct rights issues, open offers and private placements have a 
relatively lower ownership concentration (20%, 15%, and 18%, respectively), compared to CV-
firms whose ownership is highly concentrated (34%). Overall, this degree of concentration 
shows that the largest shareholders have absolute control within Chinese firms.  RI-firms are 
the smallest in terms of firm size (17.60), while convertible issuers are the largest (20.99).  This 
supports the claim that convertible issues are the natural preserve of large firms.8 
    With regards to issue-specifics surrounding the issue announcement period, rights issues 
tend to be made at a far deeper discount (0.66), compared to open offers (0.12).  In China, the 
largest shareholders commonly renounce their rights.  This arouses serious concerns among 
investors regarding potential abuses of the proceeds of the issue, who often react by failing to 
subscribe.  Underwriters set a deep discount in anticipation of a lower take-up to protect 
themselves from potential failure. Notably among these statistics, the discount for private 
placements is far smaller, at 0.097 – just below 0.10, the benchmark for discount price in private 
placements set out by the CSRC. This is evidence to suggest that PP-firms cultivate the price 
in order to comply with the CSRC benchmark.  By contrast, convertible bonds (–0.03) are sold 
at a premium.  Convertible issues are implemented by the largest firms with a strong financial 
standing, good ratings and credible guarantees, and are backed by strict regulations. The 
underwriter accordingly expects to experience the least risk owing to the full subscription by a 
confident market. 
    All rights issues are underwritten by best efforts, which is in accordance with the CSRC 
listing rules; whereas, 49.47% of open offers are underwritten in this way.  In the case of private 
placements, it is only 0.66%. In addition, 100%, 27.63% and 19.57% of the issues are 
                                                 
7.  Using analysts’ forecasts for earnings per share, we find that CV-firms present the most prosperous earnings forecasts 
measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share (12.84%), while the reverse holds for OO-firms 
(9.02%).  In terms of issue guarantees and contractual safeguards, the issue criteria are the strictest in convertible bond 
issues, helping to restrict issues to sound, well performing firms.  In private placements, the criteria are the least strict, thus 
making them more attractive to worse-performing issuers. 
8. According to the Interim Measures for the Administration of Issuance of Convertible Bonds by Listed Companies, which 
was promulgated in 1997 and revised in 2001 and 2006, a company needs to meet the following requirements in order to 
qualify for a convertible bond issue: 1) the minimum issue amount should not be less than 100 million yuan; 2) net assets 
should not be less than 2.5 billion yuan; and 3) the company must have been continuously profitable and the weighted 
averaged ROE should not be less than 10 percent in the last three accounting years. 
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underwritten by the standby method in convertible issues, private placements and open offers, 
respectively.  Full commitments are mostly used in open offers (22.78%) where the danger of 
a failed issue looms largest. This compares with 3.29% for a private placement and none for 
convertible issues.  In the case of issues which are not underwritten, the majority of private 
placements (68.42%) are privately arranged between the issuers and the buyers, but only 8.19% 
for open offers and none for rights issues. 
     In terms of auditing quality, more than half of the issuers are not audited by the ‘Top-10’, 
except with regard to open offers. This practice may reflect the old adage that ‘bad auditors 
drive out good’ with resultant damage to public confidence in the case of rights issues and 
private placements; whereas, with high quality issuance such as in convertible bonds, where 
implicit safeguards exist, the issuer sets out to minimise issue costs as in mature markets. The 
predilection for the Top-10 in the case of open offers (56%) could be explained by the 
particularly exigent need for issuers to garner every possible resource of credibility in order to 
convince the market.  
     With respect to the size of the offering, rights issues are the smallest because their size is 
contained by the 30% cap imposed by the CSRC.  The largest issues are convertible issues 
(0.68), followed by private placements (0.59) and open offers (0.47). These observations are 
consistent with Table A1 showing that private placements have overtaken open offers and 
become the dominant means of equity issuance since 2005 when the full scale of the split-share 
structure reform was launched. The shift reflects the demand for capital or asset injection for 
corporate restructuring, which accords with the intention of this reform. 
     As far as the intended use of issue proceeds is concerned, the most frequently professed 
destination is general capital investment, directed at increasing the firm’s real asset base.  This 
applies to all types of issue except for private placements, and is highest for rights issues 
(47.58%). Inter-firm allocation is the most frequently stated application in private placements 
(32.53%). Since private placements are intended to effect inter-firm allocation by means of an 
injection of fresh cash or assets by the parent, they may inevitably lead to a risk of related-party 
transactions and agency-driven intra-firm transfers.  The repayment of debt and refinancing 
working capital is the highest in open offers (13.79%).  Compared to other groups, more 
private-placement firms say that they intend to use the proceeds for research and innovation 
(26.51%).  
     OO-firms experience a greater amount of change in their debt-equity ratio (19.26%) than 
other issuers.  RI-firms have the lowest level of ΔDE ratio (10.58%), arguably because the 
smaller issues required by the CSRC restriction limits their impact on the financial structure of 
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the issuers. 
     With respect to issuance-specific features, in the case of rights issues, 90.76% of the largest 
shareholders do not take up their subscription rights or do not fully subscribe to their rights, 
confirming the wide claim that they, normally the state controllers, renounce their rights.  In 
the case of private placements, 59.59% of targeted investors are controlling shareholders, while 
40.41% are institutional investors, a practice which differs from the situation in more mature 
markets.  In the case of convertible issues, more than half of the issuers (56.79%) are assigned 
AA+ and above, but none is below A– as required by CSRC listing rules. This is evidence to 
suggest that credit ratings are uniformly high among convertible issuers who have striven to 
conform to the CSRC issuance rules. 
     In sum, our initial results indicate potentially significant, distinctive behaviour on the part 
of issuers across the different forms of seasoned issuance.  We indicate in the presentation of 
our hypotheses how this relates both to the context of finance – notably agency theory – and to 
the evolving salient aspects of modern China’s mixed economy.  These distinctions and their 
underpinnings promise testable insights into finance theory and thereby justify the further 
analysis that we propose to undertake. 
Insert Table 4 around here. 
(3) Multiple Regression Results and Discussions 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for rights issues, open offers, private placements and 
convertible bond issues based on ordinary least squares regressions of abnormal returns over 
the five–day announcement period [–2, +2] on variables that may play a role in determining 
price effects. 
     It appears that the pre-issue measures provide the market with certain insights into the 
quality of the corporate plan to which investors will be committed.  The results for the MB 
variable evince instructively contrasting results for the different forms of issues.  The 
regression coefficient on the MB ratio is highly significant and positive in the case of open 
offers (0.27, p<0.01), but negative in the case of rights issues and private placements (–0.30, –
0.23, two Ps<0.05).  It is weakly associated with convertible issues at the 10% level.   Combined 
with the results of the CAR analysis, the positive significance of MB in open offers does not 
seem to suggest that either the market or management set store by corporate growth prospects 
with higher MB presaging greater growth prospects.  Rather our findings suggest that MB 
reflects a measure of overvaluation particularly given the relative opacity of China’s market.  
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This overvaluation could partly be the result of over-exuberance and a lack of discrimination 
on the part of investors, both of which are clearly visible in the form of indiscriminate high 
volume of applications whenever a new issue occurs.  The adverse impact in the case of rights 
issues and private placements, which are prone to agency problems owing to the predominance 
of state ownership associated with the issuers, could well reflect the reality that issuers – often 
the state – take the opportunity to issue at a beneficial price to favoured parties, and the market 
fears that new investments will not reinforce prospects  but will rather encourage controlling 
shareholders to engage in related–party transactions and overinvestment.  Overall, our results 
suggest that the MB ratio is not perceived as a credible signal of prospects of future investment, 
rather than a measure of overvaluation and mispricing or a measure of market anomaly 
associated with agency costs on the part of inside parties.  However, we should be cautious 
about this interpretation as intrinsic equity values are less reliable in China than in more 
market–efficient environments. 
     The coefficient on FCASTdiverg has the expected sign with different degrees of significance.  
There is most significance in the case of convertible bonds (0.19, p<0.05) but marginal 
significance for the other forms of issues.  The relatively weak correlation suggests that the 
market has limited confidence in analysts’ earnings forecasts in the case of plain equity 
offerings in contrast to convertible offerings.  In China, as convertible bonds are subject to 
more rigorous CSRC regulation, they lend themselves to more extensive analysis than the other 
more opaque methods of equity issuance. This rigour increases the transparency and overall 
credibility of a convertible offering, leading to favourable market price behaviour.  
     Our findings in respect of price run-up provide informative differences across the types of 
issuance. We find a highly significant, positive effect in open offers (0.37, p<0.01) confirming 
our hypothesis that the price in the periods leading up to the issue comprises evidence that 
issuers go to market when shares are high or overpriced.  This result is consistent with the 
observations in the CAR analysis as reported in Tables 1 and 2.  Our finding supports the 
position that timing can be most readily achieved as suggested by Alti (2006), and is, in 
practice, being effected through equity issuance in the form of open offers.  Price run-up is, 
likewise, highly significant and positive for convertible issues (0.22, p<0.01), but the 
circumstances of convertible issuance invite a different interpretation.  In this case, price run-
up may reflect the market’s confident expectations about the quality of convertible issues due 
to their greater transparency and disciplinary obligations.  Rights issues and placements differ 
from the foregoing as well as from each other. Price run-up has a negative impact in the case 
of rights issues (–0.28, p<0.01), but a positive impact on private placements (0.27, p<0.10). 
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For rights issues, the direct extraction of wealth dominates the influence of price run–up. More 
than 90% of the largest shareholders fail to take up their subscription rights or do not fully 
subscribe to their subscription rights as shown in Table 4.  Investors regard rights issues as an 
opportunity on the part of the dominant shareholders to gather cash from the market when the 
price rises and to deploy it dysfunctionally and selfishly even to the extent, for example, of 
siphoning funds into associated companies where their proportionate interest exceeds that in 
the issuing company.  Our results lend support to Shivakumar’s (2000) and Cohen and 
Zarowin’s (2010) arguments that managers exploit mispricing opportunities in an environment 
where accounting and auditing standards are flawed.  In the case of private placements, agency 
influences and the dominance of the controlling shareholders prevail.  The management cut the 
costs of purchasing new shares by timing the issue when the price level is low rather than high. 
Such price manipulation can transfer benefits from the public to the target investors.  If and 
when in due course the price recovers, the market is reassured that controllers are discouraged 
from taking advantage of the low price. Overall, our findings across the four types of issue are 
consonant with the patterns of ARs and CARs observed for both the pre- and post-
announcement periods as displayed in Tables 1 and 2. 
     There is no evidence to suggest that market returns are associated with any pattern of pre-
issue dividend payments in the case of rights issues and convertible issues.  Further, they are 
weakly associated in the case of open offers. Our results fail to support the majority of previous 
studies that examine the roles of dividends in firm value (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Pinkowitz 
et al., 2006), but are evidence to the effect that the market does not believe that pre-issue 
dividends presage future dividend levels in these issues.  According to our data, more than 50 
percent of these issuing firms cut down or stop dividend payments shortly after the new issue 
has been completed (not shown).9  By comparison, dividend payments appear to impinge 
positively on private placements (0.26, p<0.05), suggesting that pre-issue dividends are seen 
to adumbrate future distributions following the issuance.  This is also consistent with the 
observation in Table 4, where PP-firms are the highest and most consistent dividend payers.  
The results suggest a position whereby PP-firms in particular need to attract and retain 
investors.  Their powerful subscribers possess comparative advantages, including the ability to 
enforce a desired dividend pattern.  Acquiescence on the part of the firm helps ensure that the 
                                                 
9.  In order to govern the dividend payment practice of Chinese firms, the CSRC imposed the “Management of Cash 
Dividends by Listed Companies” in 2006.  However, those firms that made issues prior to 2006 may have failed to comply 
with this regulation.  
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powerful investors do not bail out when the firm goes public. 
     Ownership concentration is of considerable importance in shaping market price behaviour. 
It generates a significant negative impact on rights issues (–0.28), open offers (–0.19) and 
particularly private placements (–0.36) at the 5% level. Our results contrast with Xu and 
Wang’s (1999) claim that ownership concentration serves to monitor Chinese firms closely. 
Agency problems permeate fundraising, and public equity investors are poorly equipped to 
monitor managerial planning and discretion.  The stronger effect in the case of private 
placements corroborates our hypothesis that ownership concentration aggravates the conflicts 
between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders who are usually the targeted 
buyers. The role of concentration revealed in our study disagrees with Hertzel and Smith’s 
(1993) report that ownership concentration makes only a minor impact on market returns. 
     Turning to the issue characteristics around the announcement period, we find that the 
discount in subscription price is the significant explanatory factor for the five-day CARs in the 
case of rights issues (–0.42, p<0.05).  As discussed in Section 2 (i), rights issues are often made 
in the interests of the largest shareholders and are rejected by minority shareholders.  
Additionally, more than 60 percent of shares in RI–firms are non-tradable due to their being 
owned by public bodies, including the state. This may generate mistrust in the market.  
Underwriters seek the means of reducing the risk associated with purchasing the shares of a 
potentially failed issue by setting higher discounts, and the market duly responds unfavourably 
in the form of negative market returns. The coefficient on open offers is marginally significant.  
This may be partly due to the fact that the discount in open offers is far less severe than in 
rights issues (see Table 4).   This may be partly a matter of the underwriters’ risk exposure 
being less significant since any underwriters’ allocations will be more easily tradable in view 
of the opportunity to trade across a wide and highly active habitat of investors.  There is no 
evidence to suggest that the price discount matters in convertible issues. This result supports 
our expectation that investors worry less about the level of the price set for convertible issues, 
as their quality is guaranteed by the high rating. 
     Our findings in the case of private placements are particularly noteworthy.  The price 
discount has a small, negative effect on the five-day CARs with a borderline significance (–
0.08, p<0.10).  However, when we consider the interaction between the discount and target 
buyers, we find a marked, contrasting impact – the force of which depends on the market 
perception of the salient characteristics of targeted investors: notably their risk, reliability and 
attitude to investment.  Specifically, the discount generates a highly significant and negative 
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effect when it interacts with the controlling shareholders, DISCBUYERController (–0.36, 
p<0.01) but a positive one when it interacts with institutional investors, DISCBUYERInstitution 
(0.27, p<0.05). These results appear to support our expectation that price discount conveys to 
the market the message that private placements are an offer to the largest shareholders to the 
detriment of public investors by way of price manipulation prior to the issue and subsequent 
engagement in related-party transactions. When privately placed shares are issued to 
institutions which have the ability to promote strategic investment, their subscription implies 
that they are both willing and able successfully to promote, pursue and consummate such 
investments – a point noted by Hertzel and Smith (1993).  Hence, the certification effect 
prevails. 
     Overall, our results with respect to the discount in subscription significantly suggest that the 
risk of adverse price effects, the quality of issues, and the agency costs pertaining to each type 
of issuance are taken into account when the new issue is planned.  
     The impact of underwriting appears to differ according to the type of efforts.  The 
underwriting of rights issues has no impact on market price behaviour. This supports our 
expectation concerning the rigidity of the CSRC policy with respect to underwriting a rights 
issue using the method of best efforts. This required procedure takes insufficient account of the 
potential risk to be borne by the underwriter during the announcement period.  In general, the 
market reacts favourably to the announcement of open offers underwritten by way of standby 
and best efforts (0.24, 0.21, two Ps<0.05), but unfavourably in the case of full commitment (–
0.33, p<0.05).  Our results for open offers appear to be consonant with the adverse selection 
hypothesis (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) to the effect that full-commitment underwriting occurs 
when issues are expected to fail, while the opposite holds for standby and best efforts.  Further, 
underwritten private placements experience significant, positive market returns, regardless of 
the level of efforts.  The results suggest that private placements are of interest to the market 
despite any price manipulation prior to the issue, not least given the scale of the issues and the 
opportunity to improve the asset portfolio by introducing cash or directly injecting real assets. 
The market is accordingly willing to acquiesce in the decision to underwrite a private 
placement. By comparison, underwriting a convertible issue by standby has a significant, 
positive influence on market price behaviour (0.21, p<0.05).  This is consistent with our 
expectations based on the instrument’s inherent discipline and issuers’ desire to minimise issue 
costs.  Taken together, although these results do not appear to consistently support our 
hypotheses and those formulated in the standard context by Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) and 
37 
 
Gopalan et al. (2011), they at least provide an indication that underwriters in China differentiate 
among underwriting methods to signal the quality of a new issue while seeking to contain issue 
costs. 
     The sign on AUDIT is positive for the five-day CARs, as expected, on all equity offerings 
with prestigious auditors.  However, the coefficients are not significant at the 5% level.  These 
weak relationships do not support the view of Hay and Davies (2004) and Claessens et al. 
(2002) with respect to the external monitoring role of the quality of auditing, but are evidence 
to the effect that China’s investors have limited confidence in the professional competence of 
auditors.  In our additional regressions, we used the ‘Big 5’ as the measure of prestige auditors 
(not reported).  The significance increases in these regressions but still not to a significance 
level.  Hence, the suggestion remains that the market still doubts the credibility of reports issued 
by the domestic CPAs. The market cannot but be conscious of the ineffective surveillance of 
the quality of corporate reporting and auditing processes. The small and non-significant 
coefficient on convertible issues provide  an indication that the market is largely indifferent to 
the auditor’s prestige, which is consistent with our proposition concerning the impact of the 
regulatory discipline surrounding convertible issues.   
     As expected, price effects of the size of an offering differ across the forms of seasoned 
offerings.  Size of offering exerts a significant, negative impact on market returns for rights 
issues at –0.40% and for open offers at –0.36%, which are qualitatively consistent with the 
negative market price reactions upon the issue announcements shown in Tables 1 and 2.  One 
could argue that the significant decrease in share price may be the result of price pressure on 
the new shares prompted by increased supply; or that the new issue may convey negative 
signals about issuers’ earning prospects (Miller and Rock, 1985). However, in line with China’s 
position, we submit that marked agency problems associated with the new issues amount to a 
substantial driving force behind these price adjustments.  We observe that 91% of the issuers 
give up their rights as shown in Table 3.  In open offers, issuers exploit the opportunity afforded 
by the lenient regulations that are not available to rights issues to gather money on a much 
larger scale.  According to a number of studies, this leniency is exploited as issuers deploy 
resources into non–profitable projects or undertake tunnelling without any accountability on 
the part of management (Liu et al., 2013).  Further inspection of our data confirms that there is 
a higher percentage of alteration of stated usage in rights issues and open offers than in other 
offerings (not shown). 
     By contrast, a positive result emerges for private placements and convertible issues.  In the 
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case of private placements, the positive impact (0.22, p<0.05) appears to reflect market trust in 
institutional subscription because the cash raised will support under-performing firms or cater 
for the firm’s need for strategic cash; these benefits being further compounded by any direct 
injection by controllers of productive assets.  Market trust to this effect offsets anxiety about 
management’s abusive discretionary behaviour in the form of overinvestment and related-party 
transactions with controlling shareholders and other insiders. The favourable appraisal of the 
financing event indicates that for the market the size of offering presages valuable productive 
investments, and may further suggest that investors trust their protective measures, privacy and 
communication associated with private placements. The positive impact in convertible issues 
(0.17, p<0.05) confirms our expectations, and also Stein (1992) and Jiraporn and Gleason 
(2007)’s view, concerning the appeal of convertible bonds to the market based on contractual 
and regulatory control. This result is also consistent with the fact that convertible bonds are 
associated with the major strategic evolution of the corporate plan. 
     Most significantly, the estimates in Table 5 show that the intended use of issue proceeds is 
a distinct determinant of market price behaviour.  Two contrasting findings are particularly 
eloquent in the following.  Firstly, the offerings for high-tech and innovation projects appear 
to exert highly significant, positive impacts on the five-day CARs, regardless of the type of 
security issued (0.50, 0.49, 0.38, 0.46, all Ps<0.01).  This result is consonant with our 
expectations that market price movement is strongly accounted for by the promise of enhancing 
the firm’s competiveness and prospects by the planned implementation of high-tech projects.  
Further, issues designated to capital expenditure generate significant and positive impacts on 
market returns (0.48, 0.44, 0.50, 0.34, all Ps<0.05).  The favourable market responses reinforce 
the suggestion that these projects are believed by the market to enhance firm value by 
productively increasing the firm’s real asset base.  The increase in capital expenditure reduces 
controlling shareholders’ discretionary opportunities to expropriate uncommitted resources 
against the interests of minority shareholders. 
     Secondly and by way of contrast to the case of issuance for high-tech projects and capital 
expenditure, issues designated to the purposes of financing inter-firm projects generate a highly 
significant and negative price effect, regardless of the form of issuance, but most notably in the 
case of private placements (–0.53, p<0.01).  It appears that the market identifies such intentions 
with rent-seeking by means of the new issue, and infers that ex post the danger of related-party 
transactions is most likely to occur.  Further, the market responds negatively to the news of 
resources being committed to refinancing debt and working capital, regardless of the form of 
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issuance.  These price effects respond to actions which do not change the firm’s investment in 
productive assets appreciably if at all, but do serve to increase free cash flow or meet cash flow 
shortfalls.  These results lend support to Walker and Yost (2008) and appear to be plausible in 
China’s culturally distinct, opaque market, where exploitable discretionary funds all too often 
precipitate moral hazard, leading to the managerial pursuit of personal interests at the expense 
of external investors. 
      Most significantly, the intended use of issue proceeds generates the most powerful impact 
of any variable on market returns and is the main force in shaping market price movement 
following the announcement. This disagrees with Denis (1994) who suggests that investment 
opportunities announcements play a small role in adjusting market prices.  The overall findings 
corroborate our suggestion that the market has insight into the motivation and economic 
significance of the intended use. 
     The capital structure measure generates consistent results.  The coefficients on the ΔDE 
ratio are negative with regard to rights issues (–0.24), open offers (–0.21) and private 
placements (–0.34) at the 5% level, with convertible bonds being –0.14 at the 10% level.  This 
suggests that the resulting decrease in DE ratio following the issuance reduces the discipline 
exerted on management and facilitates rent–seeking behaviour on the part of powerful issuers, 
as predicted in Myers (1984).  The stronger market movement in plain equity offerings is 
consistent with Chen (2004) to the effect that the management of Chinese firms prefer equity 
to debt – a decision that brings into play the agency issues which beset the market.  The market 
duly responds unfavourably to equity issues. 
    Regarding the security-specific characteristics, we find a highly significant, positive price 
effect if rights are taken up (0.31, p<0.01). Take-up reassures a market that the abuses 
associated with rights issues will be less likely to occur or will at least be on a smaller scale. 
Such reassurance is valuable in a regime where rights are usually implemented in favour of 
informed, state-controlled shareholders who are in a position to garner rewards by renouncing 
rights and diverting issue proceeds, leading to a loss of value for the public.  Our result is 
qualitatively consistent with that of Slovin et al. (2000) regarding the potential quality 
dimension associated with this variable, and provides a clear indication that in accordance with 
our hypothesis that rights issues are exposed to agency risks. 
     Further, we take a closer look at the role of target buyers in the case of private placements.  
When these buyers are controlling shareholders, a highly significant and negative impact on 
market returns occurs (–0.33, p<0.05). The negative price reaction appears to contradict the 
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majority of previous studies and theory predictions (e.g., Wruck, 1989; Chakraborty and 
Gantchev, 2013), but supports our proposal that in the case of China, the market believes that 
the controlling shareholders who are target buyers have strong incentives to engage in related-
party transactions and overinvestment.  Abuses exploit the typical pyramidal ownership 
structure and intra-group cross-holdings as noted in Liu et al. (2013). Together with the 
reported evidence from the discount in subscription price, the results markedly underpin our 
confidence that when the targeted buyer is the controlling shareholder, private placements are 
a means of issuance that are beset with agency problems which aggravate the tension between 
the controlling and minority shareholders.  However in the case where the target buyer is the 
institutional investor, the certification effect asserts itself. 
     No reliably significant excess stock returns are observed for convertible issues that are rated 
AA and above, with the five-day CARs being 0.08 at the 10% level.  Our result contrasts with 
the more common suggestion – notably the findings of Poon and Chan  (2008) which are based 
on the data available for one of China’s domestic credit rating agencies (CRAs) for the period 
1997–2003 – suggesting that ratings generate certification effects.  On the basis of credit rating 
reports issued by all qualified domestic CRAs, our results show that the ratings assigned by the 
CRAs do not convey any new information to the market about the credit risk of convertible 
bonds.  Our findings disagree with the implication of Myers and Majluf (1984) concerning the 
relevance of ratings to investors including their ability to reduce informational asymmetries.  
Rather, our findings favour the contrary position to the effect that ratings are substantially 
unheeded (Kennedy, 2003; Lee, 2006).  Ratings’ visible lack of signalling power confirms our 
doubts concerning the efficacy of credit ratings due to the uniform credit criteria set out by the 
CSRC, which may place the independence of the agencies and quality of their grading under 
question.  
Insert Table 5 here. 
(4) Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis  
 
Endogeneity 
 
Thus far, we have not considered any potential self–selection bias that might arise as a result 
of firms self–selecting their issue methods.  One cannot rule out the possibility, however, that 
high-market-return firms are more likely to select open issues; low-market-return firms tend to 
select rights issues; firms with lower leverage, or whose stock has high market liquidity, are 
more inclined to opt for convertible issues; and those with a desire to retain corporate control 
41 
 
are more prone to choose private placings. In such a case, our previous results, based on the 
sample of issuing firms, may be subject to self-selection bias in estimated CAR coefficients 
due to the potential endogeneity of the data.  We address this issue by way of the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage regression approach to take into account the self-selection of the issue 
method.  In the first stage, we carry out a Probit regression in which the likelihood of the choice 
of issue method, denoted by Pr(ISSUE), is regressed on a set of variables that might play a role 
in the firm’s issue method decision. This uses the entire sample, including both issuing and 
non-issuing firms, on the basis of Equation (5). We then compute the inverse Mills ratio (non-
selection hazard), denoted by Lambda, from the first-stage Probit estimates of Equation (5), 
and incorporate Lambda into the second-stage regressions to account for any potential 
endogeneity. The first-stage selection equation is expressed as follows:  
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where ISSUEi,t is coded as one for each of the issue methods for firm i in year t,  and zero 
otherwise. Market volatility (VOLAT) is measured as the standard deviation of daily return 
over the preceding three months on the rolling basis. Liquidity (LIQ) is the relative bid-ask 
spread measured as the dealer’s bid-ask spread divided by the average of the bid-price and the 
ask-price.  CAR (CAR–150, –20) is measured as the abnormal return between –150 and – 20 trading 
days on the rolling basis.  Market-to-book ratio (MB) is measured as the sum of assets plus the 
market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by assets.  Leverage (LEV) is 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation, adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding 
year.  Managerial ownership (MAN) is measured as the percentage of outstanding shares owned 
by managers. Year and industry dummies are included to control for year and industry fixed 
effects, and i,t is an error term.10  The rationale of independent variables is described below. 
     The decision to implement a new issue may depend on a variety of factors, including the 
stock market condition of an individual stock, firm-specific features, and ownership and control 
considerations.  To measure the stock market condition of an individual stock, we use market 
volatility (VOLAT), market liquidity (LIQ), and market price performance (CAR–150, –20).  To 
                                                 
10.  According to the 2012 CSRC Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies, the sample firms are classified 
into 13 broad industries. Each firm is grouped into one of the industries in each year as;  Agriculture; Mining, 
Manufacturing, Utility, Construction, Transportation, Information Technology, Retail and Wholesale, Real Estate, 
Financial Institutions (the firms in this industry are excluded from this study), Services, News and Media, and 
Conglomerates. The industry variable in this study is a time-varying variable. 
42 
 
capture firm-specific features, we use the firm’s potential growth (MB), leverage (LEV), and 
firm size (SIZE). To measure the effect of ownership and control considerations, we use 
managerial ownership (MAN).  We also include the stock’s market uncertainty and market 
liquidity, because the decision to issue may systematically differ between firms, given that each 
issue method exposes firms to different levels of market uncertainty and market liquidity. High 
market volatility for rights issues may induce management to issue shares by means of an open 
offer (Barnes and Walker, 2006).  The market liquidity conditions of an individual stock may 
be instrumental in influencing the firm’s choice of issue method, presenting the market with 
different levels of information friction and costs of trading stocks (Butler et al., 2005).  
Managers may exploit security mispricing and timing exercising issues in their belief that the 
firm is overvalued when a variety of issue methods are permitted (Cready and Gurun, 2010).  
We include the measures for firm-specific characteristics, because a firm’s growth potential 
and financial structure may influence market perception of the firm and hence the interests of 
investors (Liu et al., 2013).  The decision to issue may systematically differ between well- and 
under-performing firms as well as high- and low-growth firms (Jain and Kini, 1999).  Further, 
leverage can transgress corporate debt capacity, leading to distress.  A seasoned equity issue 
which affects the debt ratio beyond its optimal level would pose a serious threat to the firm’s 
continuity, and thus influence the management’s issue method decision, especially in the case 
of financially-distressed firms (Myers, 1984).  Further, larger firms tend to have a lower degree 
of uncertainty and information asymmetry, but at the same time a greater need for financial 
resources and financial mobility to meet the demand for future investment because of the scale 
of their operations (Jain and Kini, 1999).  Notably in China, private placements and convertible 
bonds are preferred, partly because of the cap imposed by the CSRC on rights issues, and later 
on cash offers, in order to restore order in the issuing market, which would otherwise have been 
exploited by self-interest-driven issuers (see Table A1).  Finally, the firm’s issue decision may 
be driven by corporate ownership and control considerations.  Equity issues dilute ownership, 
which is likely to militate against the managerial control of the firm, deterring management 
from making issues (Masulis, 1986).   
     Section A in Table 6 presents the first-stage estimates.  Overall, we find that the issuer's 
desire to increase the stock’s market liquidity has a significant influence on the issuing 
decision, regardless of the specific issue method concerned. At the same time, the issuer’s 
capital structure does not appear to influence the issue method chosen, even in the case of 
convertible bond issues, and hence does not appear to fit as well as the capital structure 
hypothesis (Myers, 1984) would suggest.  Our further results show that the other variables 
43 
 
generate differential impacts on the likelihood of the issue method decision.  Lower market 
volatility and lower growth potential make the firm more likely to opt for a rights issue.  Larger 
market volatility and greater upward price movement tend to induce the firm to issue shares by 
means of an open offer.  Moreover, lower abnormal returns and a stronger incentive to keep 
ownership and control over the firm lead to a greater propensity to raise equity capital by way 
of private placements.  Greater growth prospects and larger firm size are more likely to give 
management an incentive to raise cash through convertible issues. 
     Section B reports the second-stage regression results following adjustment for self-selection 
by incorporating Lambda in the regression models. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no sample selection bias, i.e. H0: beta lambda = 0, because all P values are greater than 
0.10 in all four cases. Our results, thus, do not suggest the presence of sample selection bias. 
Furthermore, corrections for potential self-selection bias have not altered the main results 
shown in Table 5. The coefficients of the size of the offering continue to be significant and 
negative in the case of rights issues and open offers, while the opposite holds true in the case 
of private placements and convertible issues.  The results of the other controlled variables 
remain similar to those reported in Table 5 in terms of statistical significance and sign. Hence, 
our overall results do not indicate that potential selection bias due to endogeneity is a serious 
concern for our estimates. 
 
Analysis of the Announcement Period Window [0, +2] 
 
We conducted further analysis of the issue announcement period CARs over the time window 
of the announcement day, and two days afterwards [0, +2].  We used abnormal returns over the 
[0, +2] window as the dependent variable.  The results are reported in Table 7.  Compared to 
Table 5, it appears that the variables featuring the pre-issue characteristics become less 
significant in terms of the statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients for the 
three-day announcement period abnormal returns, except in the case of ownership 
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index. On the contrary, the variables featuring 
issue characteristics and, in particular, security-specific features, generate more significant and 
stronger impacts on the three-day announcement period abnormal returns in the majority of 
cases. Specifically, the size of the offering (OFFER) and intended usage of issue proceeds 
(FUSETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC) stand out, especially in the case of rights issues 
and open offers. 
     Our results consistently suggest that a temporary increase in firm value following the 
announcement of an issue is associated with seasoned offerings in terms of the size and scale 
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of the issuance itself, and the subsequent usage of issue proceeds that are intended for high-
tech projects and fixed investments.  Firm value experiences a temporary reduction when funds 
are claimed for inter-firm use and debt and working capital refinancing, reinforcing our prior 
results and remaining consistent with the agency cost.  In comparison to the five-day 
announcement period CARs as reported in Table 5, the stronger impacts of rights take-up 
(TAKEUP) and targeted investors (BUYER) substantiate our prior observations that the take-
up of the rights by the largest shareholders in a rights issue and the type of targeted buyers in 
a private placement issue strong signals to the market when it forms a perception on the outlook 
of issuers and hence the interests of investors.  Overall, the apparent market price movements 
in the three-day announcement period provide clear evidence to suggest that the market is more 
reactive to the characteristics featuring the issuer and issue in the first three days after the issue 
announcement.   
Insert Table 7 here. 
Analysis of the Offer Period Window from the Day before the Offer Period to the Offer 
Expiry Date [–A1, X0] 
Evidence in the existing literature suggests that the offer period may influence the specific 
impact of the occurrence of an event (e.g., Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). We therefore perform further tests on the offer period from the day before 
the offer period to the offer expiry date [–A1, X0].  The mean (median) duration between the 
announcement date and the offer expiry date in our sample is 30 (33) days.  We use abnormal 
returns over the [–A1, X0] window as the dependent variable.  The results are reported in Table 
8.  The majority of the results are qualitatively similar to those reported for the five-day 
announcement CARs. Specifically, the coefficients of discount in the subscription price 
(DISC), intended use of issue proceeds (USETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC), size of 
offering (OFFER), underwriting (UNDER), rights take-up (TAKEUP) and targeted investors 
(BUYER) have the same sign with statistical significance, regardless of the type of issuance.  
Auditing (AUDIT) and credit ratings (RATE) continue to appear not to be statistically related 
to the CARs while analysts’ forecasts (FCASTdiverg) are shown to be marginally related to the 
CARs in the plain equity offerings, providing further support for the weak association between 
these variables and market returns as identified in our primary analyses.  The signs and 
significance of other variables, such as price run-up, dividend payment practice, ownership 
concentration and debt-equity ratio, remain largely unchanged in comparison with those from 
our primary model, except in the case of the market-to-book ratio (MBpre-issue) and firm size 
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(SIZEpre-issue). We are therefore able to conclude that these results largely support our main 
findings. 
     Further, we conduct diagnostic tests on multicollinearity in our regressions. The presence 
of multicollinearity among independent variables can inflate standard errors, which may result 
in less-efficient parameter estimates. To assess this possibility, we conduct two tests of 
multicollinearity. First, we check correlations among the independent variables using the 
correlation matrix. The values range between 0.02 and 0.67, with none exceeding the 0.80 
threshold (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Second, we conduct a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) 
test.  The values range between 1.25 and 3.49, and none is above the VIF threshold of 10 
(O’Brien, 2007).  These two tests justify our confidence to the effect that multicollinearity is 
not a problem in our regressions.  
Insert Table 8 here. 
5. CONCLUSION 
By reference to 1,659 seasoned issues over the period 1991–2010, we seek to identify and 
analyse the factors which most powerfully explain the market reaction across the full range of 
seasoned issuance methods used by Chinese companies.  In so doing, we increase insight into 
an emerging market’s progress towards pricing efficiency and also into the factors that both 
assist and hinder such progress, paying due attention to the activities of influential capital 
providers, market monitors and financial infrastructure builders.  
     Our research questions and the attendant hypotheses yield instructive results.  Our results 
demonstrate that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference between 
management’s internal assessment and the market’s assessment of stock price across the 
different types of issuance.  Open offers and notably rights offers are unfavourably received.  
Convertible issues generate the most positive signals. Private placements experience an 
unfavourable pre-announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after 
the event. Our further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to 
issuer and issue, as well as matters specific to the context of China by reference to the period 
immediately surrounding the issuance.   
     Our research recognises the progress of China towards greater market transparency and 
more effective regulation, directed at inhibiting and remedying corporate and individual 
misbehaviour.  This regulation helps to generate information that can signal the quality of a 
new issue.  Despite such progress, public incredulity emerges strongly from our further 
exploration of the drive behind the price movements surrounding issuance. Such incredulity is 
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reflected in the insignificance that the market attributes to relatively unreliable criteria, namely 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, the potency of the underwriting process, ratings, and the quality 
of auditing services. Concerns such as these are consistent with public scepticism with respect 
to both management and their gatekeepers.  These limitations, in turn, epitomise the constraints 
within the existing system, where the prevention, control and resolution of market risks are 
largely dependent on policy adjustments, covenants and other security safeguards.  The 
auditing and ratings professions remain regulated by the government, while the utility of 
auditing services and credit ratings are not yet fully realised in this less than efficient capital 
market.  Their role does not appear to enjoy the degree of credibility that applies in more mature 
regimes.   
     We have reported wide-ranging evidence that public incredulity is well founded.  Our results 
consistently reveal a lack, inadequacy or failure of investor-relevant market mechanisms which 
would help to reduce informational asymmetries.  Specifically, we find evidence of interfering 
with the market pricing process and the exploitation of resources by powerful, self-seeking 
control groupings.  These occur both in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of a security offering 
and are designed to generate gains at the expense of minority investors and other outsiders.  
Rights issues, open offers, and private placements are particularly affected by agency costs 
including those of free cash flow. They carry relatively light contractual obligations and can be 
driven by short-termism and perverse personal incentives.  In a setting of informational 
asymmetries, this degree of managerial discretion compounds a sense of uncertainty.  Such 
imperfections are aggravated by ineffective monitoring and lead to a material departure from 
shareholder wealth maximisation. Powerful managers can and do abuse and misappropriate 
acquired funds. The active involvement of moneyed interests, including the state, is a pervading 
influence. In the case of convertible bond issues, credible regulatory discipline considerably 
reduces dysfunctional opportunities.  
     Centrally, the picture is of a market in progress, contending with agency costs, incredulity 
and misbehaviour.  Our salient conclusion, as reflected throughout the results, is, accordingly, 
that market reaction betokens the evolving but still immature state of China’s equity 
marketplace and the status of their imperfect corporate control. 
     Our findings carry policy implications. The identification of the distinctiveness, impacts 
and threats of the forms of equity issuance suggests where remedial action towards greater 
market efficiency might be directed. The rewards are more productive capital allocation and 
apposite financing arrangements with sufficient protection of investors.  By way of future 
research, we hope that our work will stimulate enquiry into its implications for China’s 
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increasingly international equity issuance. New insights stand to be gained into the perspicacity 
of the securities market and the quality of information.  Such further enquiry will help to meet 
the demands of the growing number of sophisticated international investors in China with an 
interest in the local sourcing of funds and funding partnerships. All of these phenomena will 
advance China’s financial market in its progress towards greater efficiency, completeness and 
maturity. 
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Table 1 
Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
           Rights  Issues    Open Offers Private Placements      Convertible Bond 
Issues 
Day(s) Mean       SE Mean  SE Mean  SE Mean  SE 
             
–30 0.0001  (0.0024) –0.0008 *
* 
(0.0004) –0.0020  (0.0068) –0.0010  (0.0007) 
–29 0.0002  (0.0021) –0.0009  (0.0058) –0.0023  (0.0032) 0.0013 * (0.0007) 
–28 –0.0006  (0.0022) 0.0053  (0.0057) 0.0041 * (0.0024) 0.0014  (0.0027) 
–27 –0.0009 * (0.0005) 0.0057  (0.0061) –0.0013  (0.0032) 0.0021 ** (0.0009) 
–26 –0.0012  (0.0022) –0.0002  (0.0055) –0.0011  (0.0027) –0.0001  (0.0017) 
–25 0.0008  (0.0022) –0.0040  (0.0061) 0.0004  (0.0031) 0.0018  (0.0025) 
–24 –0.0013  (0.0018) –0.0021  (0.0054) 0.0015  (0.0033) –0.0002  (0.0023) 
–23 –0.0001  (0.0019) –0.0034  (0.0064) –0.0021 ** (0.0010) (0.0002  (0.0023) 
–22 0.0007  (0.0020) –0.0013  (0.0062) –0.0013  (0.0033) 0.0009  (0.0025) 
–21 –0.0015 * (0.0008) 0.0044 * (0.0023) 0.0011  (0.0029) 0.0013  (0.0021) 
–20 –0.0011  (0.0023) –0.0040  (0.0068) –0.0009  (0.0032) 0.0021 * (0.0012) 
–19 –0.0014  (0.0022) –0.0021  (0.0068) –0.0016  (0.0029) 0.0015  (0.0022) 
–18 –0.0034 * (0.0018) –0.0038  (0.0090) –0.0018 ** (0.0008) 0.0038  (0.0025) 
–17 –0.0016  (0.0022) 0.0043  (0.0070) –0.0012  (0.0033) 0.0037 * (0.0021) 
–16 –0.0012  (0.0024) –0.0026  (0.0075) –0.0026 * (0.0015) 0.0009  (0.0024) 
–15 –0.0008  (0.0022) –0.0037  (0.0056) –0.0005  (0.0033) –0.0006  (0.0025) 
–14 –0.0013  (0.0019) –0.0024  (0.0043) 0.0001  (0.0030) 0.0012  (0.0025) 
–13 –0.0009  (0.0024) –0.0002  (0.0036) –0.0027  (0.0032) –0.0008  (0.0027) 
–12 0.0002  (0.0024) 0.0028  (0.0025) –0.0013  (0.0033) 0.0018  (0.0018) 
–11 –0.0007  (0.0022) 0.0030  (0.0059) –0.0016  (0.0030) 0.0024 * (0.0013) 
–10 –0.0011 * (0.0006) 0.0052  (0.0060) –0.0025  (0.0033) 0.0035  (0.0026) 
–9 –0.0009  (0.0022) 0.0029 * (0.0017) –0.0022  (0.0033) –0.0009  (0.0025) 
–8 0.0003  (0.0019) –0.0017  (0.0064) –0.0084 ** (0.0034) 0.0037 ** (0.0016) 
–7 –0.0013  (0.0018) 0.0028  (0.0064) –0.0012  (0.0033) –0.0028  (0.0021) 
–6 –0.0021  (0.0024) 0.0041 * (0.0024) 0.0007  (0.0034) 0.0019  (0.0023) 
–5 –0.0037 * (0.0020) 0.0032  (0.0066) –0.0013  (0.0030) 0.0022 ** (0.0011) 
–4 –0.0014  (0.0020) 0.0081  (0.0078) –0.0049 ** (0.0025) 0.0019  (0.0021) 
–3 –0.0021 * (0.0012) 0.0103 * (0.0061) –0.0033 * (0.0019) 0.0018 * (0.0010) 
–2 –0.0019 ** (0.0008) 0.0051 * (0.0030) –0.0028 * (0.0017) 0.0018 ** (0.0008) 
–1 –0.0013 **
* 
(0.0005) 0.0042 *
* 
(0.0018) –0.0026 ** (0.0012) 0.0021 ** (0.0009) 
AD –0.0063 **
* 
(0.0016) –0.0056 *
*
* 
(0.0021) –0.0037 *** (0.0014) 0.0039 *** (0.0002) 
1 –0.0048 ** (0.0019) –0.0048 *
*
* 
(0.0018) 0.0051 *** (0.0002) 0.0028 *** (0.0003) 
2 –0.0021 ** (0.0010) –0.0025 * (0.0014) 0.0048 ** (0.0024) 0.0021 ** (0.0009) 
3 –0.0019 ** (0.0009) –0.0035 *
* 
(0.0017) 0.0035 ** (0.0017) 0.0027 ** (0.0013) 
4 –0.0021 * (0.0011) –0.0019 *
* 
(0.0009) 0.0023 * (0.0014) 0.0015 * (0.0008) 
5 –0.0016 * (0.0009) –0.0013 * (0.0007) 0.0012 ** (0.0006) 0.0014 * (0.0008) 
6 0.0014 * (0.0008) –0.0012 * (0.0007) 0.0023 * (0.0014) 0.0019 ** (0.0009) 
7 –0.0009 ** (0.0004) –0.0037 *
* 
(0.0018) 0.0012  (0.0032) 0.0045 * (0.0025) 
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8 –0.0011  (0.0042) –0.0034  (0.0039) 0.0011  (0.0032) 0.0005  (0.0024) 
9 –0.0029 * (0.0017) –0.0016  (0.0025) 0.0019 * (0.0010) –0.0009 * (0.0005) 
10 0.0013  (0.0030) –0.0012 * (0.0007) –0.0003  (0.0029) 0.0013  (0.0019) 
11 –0.0019 * (0.0010) 0.0008  (0.0061) –0.0006  (0.0023) 0.0014  (0.0018) 
12 –0.0008  (0.0031) 0.0005  (0.0038) 0.0021 * (0.0012) 0.0046 ** (0.0023) 
13 –0.0005  (0.0032) 0.0011  (0.0027) 0.0014  (0.0032) 0.0011  (0.0025) 
14 0.0006  (0.0018) –0.0029 * (0.0016) 0.0014  (0.0035) 0.0012  (0.0018) 
15 –0.0011  (0.0028) –0.0012  (0.0038) 0.0033 ** (0.0016) 0.0016 * (0.0009) 
16 –0.0017 ** (0.0007) –0.0027  (0.0065) 0.0016  (0.0031) –0.0004  (0.0025) 
17 0.0003  (0.0035) –0.0003  (0.0063) –0.0010  (0.0030) 0.0001  (0.0021) 
18 –0.0019  (0.0027) –0.0027 * (0.0016) 0.0016  (0.0033) 0.0007  (0.0024) 
19 –0.0024  (0.0015) 0.0004  (0.0067) 0.0010  (0.0035) 0.0036 ** (0.0018) 
20 –0.0022 * (0.0013) 0.0006  (0.0056) 0.0027 ** (0.0013) 0.0024  (0.0023) 
21 0.0008  (0.0145) –0.0014  (0.0074) 0.0018  (0.0033) 0.0041 * (0.0022) 
22 –0.0019  (0.0150) –0.0010  (0.0066) 0.0004  (0.0033) 0.0029  (0.0025) 
23 –0.0021 * (0.0012) –0.0006  (0.0052) 0.0007  (0.0034) 0.0032 * (0.0018) 
24 0.0004  (0.0147) –0.0008  (0.0076) –0.0002  (0.0035) 0.0013  (0.0022) 
25 –0.0016  (0.0149) –0.0023  (0.0077) –0.0003  (0.0029) 0.0004  (0.0024) 
26 –0.0019 ** (0.0009) 0.0005  (0.0075) 0.0014 * (0.0008) 0.0006  (0.0026) 
27 –0.0014  (0.0106) 0.0007  (0.0046) 0.0016  (0.0033) 0.0029 ** (0.0014) 
28 –0.0004  (0.0111) –0.0011  (0.0074) 0.0017  (0.0033) –0.0008  (0.0024) 
29 –0.0012  (0.0132) –0.0024 *
* 
(0.0012) 0.0031 ** (0.0015) 0.0014  (0.0025) 
30 –0.0011  (0.0160) –0.0020  (0.0046) –0.0001  (0.0031) 0.0012 * (0.0007) 
Before AD             
Mean  –0.0011   0.0013   –0.0015   0.0013   
Minimum –0.0037   –0.0040   –0.0084   –0.0028   
25th centile –0.0014   –0.0021   –0.0025   0.0004   
Median –0.0012   0.0013   –0.0015   0.0017   
75th centile –0.0006   0.0043   –0.0010   0.0021   
Maximum 0.0008   0.0103   0.0041   0.0038   
After AD             
Mean  –0.0014   –0.0015   0.0014   0.0018   
Minimum –0.0063   –0.0056   –0.0037   –0.0009   
25th centile –0.0020   –0.0026   0.0006   0.0009   
Median –0.0016   –0.0013   0.0014   0.0014   
75th centile –0.0007   –0.0005   0.0022   0.0029   
Maximum 0.0014   0.0011   0.0051   0.0046   
Observations 931   175   340   81   
 
Note: 
This table reports mean daily abnormal returns and the standardised residual t–tests (SRT) for Equation (1) based on the market 
model for the issue announcements by way of rights issues, open offers, private placements and convertible bond issues.   
SE denotes standard error.  
AD denotes announcement date. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
        Rights Issues           Open Offers      Private Placements Convertible Bond Issues 
CAR [Event window] Mean  SE Mean  SE Mean SE Mean SE 
             
CAR [–20, –1] –0.0277 ** (0.0137) 0.0355 *** (0.0185) –0.0426 ** (0.0211) 0.0312  (0.0216) 
CAR [–10, –1] –0.0155  (0.0258) 0.0442  (0.0407) –0.0285  (0.0190) 0.0152  (0.0209) 
CAR [–5, –1] –0.0104 * (0.0056) 0.0309  (0.0210) –0.0149 ** (0.0066) 0.0098  (0.0060) 
CAR [–2, –1] –0.0032 * (0.0018) 0.0093 * (0.0049) –0.0054 * (0.0028) 0.0039 * (0.0021) 
CAR [–1,  0] –0.0076 * (0.0042) –0.0014  (0.0016) –0.0063 * (0.0034) 0.0060 * (0.0032) 
CAR [–1, +1] –0.0124  (0.0120) –0.0062 ** (0.0031) –0.0012 * (0.0007) 0.0088 ** (0.0035) 
CAR [–2, +2] –0.0164 *** (0.0023) –0.0036 ** (0.0018) 0.0008 *** (0.0003) 0.0127 ** (0.0057) 
CAR [0, +2] –0.0132 ** (0.0067) –0.0129 ** (0.0065) 0.0062 *** (0.0021) 0.0088 * (0.0045) 
CAR [+1, +5] –0.0125 ** (0.0054) –0.0140 ** (0.0072) 0.0169 ** (0.0086) 0.0105 ** (0.0046) 
CAR [+1, +10] –0.0147 * (0.0083) –0.0251 ** (0.0115) 0.0231 * (0.0137) 0.0178 * (0.0093) 
CAR [+1, +20] –0.0263 ** (0.0124) –0.0315 *** (0.0127) 0.0366 * (0.0195) 0.0341  (0.0218) 
Observations 931   175   340  81  
 
Note: 
The table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the standardised residual t–tests (SRT) for Equation (2) based 
on the market model for various windows around the issue announcements by way of rights issues, open offers, private 
placements and convertible bond issues. Event window [–day, +day] refers to the time period from the number of days before 
the announcement date to the number of days after the announcement date. 
SE denotes standard error. 
*, ** and ***denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Definition of Variables 
         Description Variable Definition and Measurement  
Pre–issue characteristics   
Market–to–book ratio  MBPre-issue [Total assets + market value of equity – book value of  equity] / total assets 
prior to the issue  
Analyst’s forecasts FCASTDiverg Divergence between the analyst’s forecasts and actual earnings for the year in 
which the new issue is undertaken  
Run–up in stock prices RUNUP Market–adjusted abnormal returns over the 180-day window [–181, –1] with 
using the value–weighted market index as the benchmark. The market index 
is the Shanghai and Shenzhen value–weighted return for the firms listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, respectively. 
Dividend payment DIV 
 
Dummy variable carries value of 1 if the issuer paid dividends in the two years 
prior to the issue; 0 otherwise  
Ownership concentration Herf1; Herf3 Herfindahl index measured as the sum of the squared percentage of shares 
held by the largest shareholder (Herf1) or as the sum of the squared percentage 
of shares held by the largest three shareholders within the firm (Herf3), as at 
the balance sheet date immediately prior to the issue announcement 
Firm size   SIZEPre-issue 
 
Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation prior to the issue, 
adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding year 
   
Issue characteristics   
Discount in subscription price  
 
DISC Discount rate measured by , where  is the average 
closing price for the 20 trading days prior to the issue announcement date,  
is the subscription price for the new shares 
Underwriting UnderStandby Dummy variable for standby method carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 UnderBest Dummy variable for best effort method carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 UnderFull Dummy variable for full commitment method carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
   
Auditor quality AUDIT Dummy variable carries value of 1 if the auditor is a Top–10 auditor; 0 
otherwise 
Size of offering 
 
OfferALL 
OfferRI 
OfferOO 
OfferPP 
OfferCV 
OfferALL, OfferRI, OfferOO, OfferPP and OfferCV measured as the ratio of gross 
proceeds raised through all issues combined, rights issues, open  offers, private 
placements and convertible bond issues, respectively, over the firm’s market 
capitalisation at the accounting year end preceding the issue 
Intended use of issue proceeds FUSETech Dummy variable for innovation and high–tech projects carries value of 1; 0 
otherwise 
 FUSEFixed  Dummy variable for general fixed investment carries value of 1; 0 otherwise  
 FUSEIntra Dummy variable for intra–firm investment carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 FUSEDWC Dummy variable for repayment of debt or financing working capital needs 
carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
   
Change in capital structure ΔDE Total book value of short term and long term debt divided by the market value 
of the firm, adjusted by the size of offering, as defined in Equation (4) 
   
Security–specific characteristics 
Take–up of the rights by the largest 
shareholders in rights issues 
TAKEUP  Dummy variable in the case of a rights issue carries value of 1 if the largest 
shareholders take up the rights; 0 if they renounce the rights 
Target buyer in private placements   
 BUYERController 
 
Dummy variable in the case of a private placement carries value of 1 if the 
shares are sold to the controlling shareholders; 0 otherwise 
 BUYERInstitution Dummy variable in the case of a private placement carries value of 1 if the 
shares are sold to the controlling shareholders; 0 if otherwise 
 BUYEROther  
   Dummy variable in the case of a convertible issue carries value of 1 if the 
convertible is assigned AA+ and above; 0 if the rating is below AA+ but above 
A– 
**
20, /)( PPP tsub  20, tsubP
*P
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Credit rating for convertible issues RATE  
 
UnderNone refer to those projects that are not underwritten  
FUSEOTHE refer to other types of investment that are not defined as FUSETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC 
NON-TAKEUP refers to a rights issue that is not taken up by the largest shareholders 
BUYEROther refers to other types of buyers in the case of a private placement 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for Variables in Regression Analysis 
 Total Sample Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible  Bond Issues 
Pre–issue characteristics           
MBPre-issue          2.3794 1.4848 1.6224 1.8236 1.7553 1.6198 1.5456 1.7523 1.4141 0.1881 
FCASTDiverg –0.00009 0.0009 –0.00003 0.0045 0.00017 0.0032 0.00005 0.0459 –0.00001 0.0115 
RUNUP 0.1549 0.2561 0.1915 0.4943 0.2856 0.1713 –0.0329 0.3188 0.1024 0.1473 
DIV 1108 0.7247 578 0.6208 162 0.9310 301 0.8776 67 0.8272 
Herf3 0.1982 0.1486 0.2034 0.1472 0.1532 0.1351 0.1767 0.1421 0.3382 0.1626 
SIZEPre-issue  18.8675 0.9610 17.6036 0.7858 18.2577 0.8729 18.1481 0.9337 20.9898 1.2154 
           
Issue characteristics           
DISC 0.5033 1.2042 0.6655 0.934 0.1246 0.1027 0.0965 1.2036 –0.0316 0.3969 
UNDERBest 835 0.6185 694 1.00 139 0.4947 2 0.0066 0 0 
UNDERFull 74 0.0548 0 0 64 0.2278 10 0.0329 0 0 
UNDERStandby 210 0.1556 0 0 55 0.1957 84 0.2763 71 1.00 
UNDERNone 231 0.1711 0 0 23 0.0819 208 0.6842  0 
AUDITTop10 537 35.1943 369 0.3968 98 0.5612 137 0.4029 39 0.49312 
AUDITNon–Top10 836 54.8139 562 0.6032 77 0.4388 203 0.5971 41 0.5070 
Size of offering 0.3093 0.3413 0.2907 0.2125 0.4720 0.6165 0.5851 0.6638 0.6791 0.3202 
FUSETech 403 0.2353 221 0.2374 41 0.2020 132 0.2651 9 0.1111 
FUSEFixed 660 0.3853 443 0.4758 65 0.3202 122 0.2450 30 0.3704 
FUSEIntra 362 0.2113 139 0.1493 43 0.2118 162 0.3253 18 0.2222 
FUSEDWC 128 0.0747 55 0.0591 28 0.1379 35 0.0703 10 0.1235 
FUSEOther 160 0.0934 73 0.0784 26 0.1281 47 0.0944 14 0.1728 
ΔDE 0.1287 0.3606 0.1085 0.2406 0.1926 0.3264 0.1755 0.5680 0.1346 0.2419 
           
Security–specific characteristics           
TAKEUP 86 0.0924 86 0.0924       
NON–TAKEUP 845 0.9076 845 0.9076       
BUYERController 137 40.4130     137 40.4130   
BUYERInstitution 202 59.5870     202 59.5870   
Rate (AA+ and above) 46 56.7901      46 56.7901 
Rate (below AA+ but above A– 35 43.2099      35 43.2099 
Note: 
Table 4 reports the basic characteristics of variables across the four types of seasoned issuance. For continuous variables, the reported figures are the median and standard deviation; for 
categorical variables, the reported figures are the number and percentage. Continuous variables refer to MB, FCASTdiverg, RUNUP, Herf3, SIZE, DISC, Size of offering, and ΔDE.  The 
remaining variables are categorical variables. 
For the definition of the variables, see Table 3.
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Table 5 
Regression Results of the Five–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–2, +2])  
around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
Variable Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements   Convertible Bond Issues 
Pre–issue characteristics        
MBPre-issue –0.303 
** 0.273 *** –0.226 * 0.114 * 
  (0.150)  (0.106)  (0.119)  (0.067)  
FCASTDiverg 0.156 
* 0.208 * 0.268 * 0.194 ** 
 (0.089)  (0.126)  (0.145)  (0.096)  
RUNUP –0.283 *** 0.372 *** 0.271 * 0.224 *** 
 (0.109)  (0.124)  (0.153)  (0.078)  
DIV 0.127  0.273 * 0.255 ** 0.163  
 (0.142)  (0.152)  (0.127)  (0.129)  
Herf3 –0.275 ** –0.191 ** –0.358 ** 0.257 ** 
 (0.138)  (0.082)  (0.161)  (0.111)  
SIZEPre-issue –0.161 
* –0.254  –0.217  0.138  
 (0.096)  (0.157)  (0.133)  (0.146)  
Issue characteristics 
  
        
DISC –0.416 ** –0.348 * –0.083 * –0.251  
 (0.199)  (0.211)  (0.049)  (0.207)  
DISC×BUYERController     –0.356 ***   
     (0.132)    
DISC×BUYERInstitution     0.268 **   
     (0.130)    
UNDERStandby   0.242 ** 0.171 * 0.218 ** 
   (0.121)  (0.099)  (0.104)  
UNDERBest 0.228  0.205 ** 0.182 *   
 (0.141 ) (0.103)  (0.102)    
UNDERFull   –0.327 ** 0.137 *   
   (0.164)  (0.081)    
AUDIT 0.142  0.197 * 0.183 * 0.092  
 (0.087)  (0.119)  (0.108)  (0.082)  
Size of offering –0.395 ** –0.364 ** 0.219 ** 0.174 ** 
 (0.163)  (0.161)  (0.087)  (0.085)  
FUSETech 0.498 *** 0.492 *** 0.377 *** 0.462 *** 
 (0.151)  (0.124)  (0.139)  (0.138)  
FUSEFixed 0.482 ** 0.440 ** 0.501 *** 0.335 ** 
 (0.219)  (0.176)  (0.167)  (0.165)  
FUSEIntra –0.514 ** –0.518 ** –0.529 *** –0.354 ** 
 (0.216)  (0.253)  (0.175)  (0.169)  
FUSEDWC –0.523 *** –0.478 ** –0.468 *** –0.413 * 
 (0.129)  (0.231)  (0.182)  (0.236)  
ΔDE –0.237 ** –0.212 ** –0.337 ** –0.144 * 
 (0.115)   (0.103)   (0.165)   (0.082)  
Security–specific characteristics          
TAKEUP 0.312 ***        
 (0.085)         
BUYER     –0.330 **    
     (0.164     
RATE       0.081  * 
       (0.046)  
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       Observations  417 135 261 61  
R2 0.112 0.188 0.552 0.315  
F 2.767 1.840  4.852 1.896  
p–value 0.0003 0.0307  <0.01 0.0498  
 
Note: 
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the 5-day window 
around the issue announcement date, CAR [−2, +2]. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. F denotes the overall F statistic, which is used to test the overall significance of the regression model, with the 
null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients are equal to zero. We control for year and industry effects using year and 
industry dummy variables in all the regressions.  
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Heckman Two–stage Regression Results of the Five–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–2, +2]) 
around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
 Section A  Section B 
 First–stage Probit Regression with dependent 
variable = Pr(ISSUE) 
 Heckman Approach with Lambda  Included 
 Rights 
Issues 
 Open 
Offers 
 Private 
Placements 
 Convertible 
Issues 
 Rights 
Issues 
 Open 
Offers 
 Private 
Placements 
 Convertible 
Bond Issues 
 
Pre–issue characteristics 
MBpre-issue         –0.375 ** 0.434 **
* 
–0.255 * 0.155  
         (0.154)  (0.112)  (0.137)  (0.102)  
FCASTDiverg         0.115  0.196 * 0.233  0.258 ** 
         (0.116)  (0.103)  (0.245)  (0.122)  
RUNUP         –0.258 ** 0.295 ** 0.127  0.228 ** 
         (0.126)  (0.144)  (0.079)  (0.104)  
DIV         0.219  0.158  0.281 ** 0.168  
         (0.136)  (0.142)  (0.136)  (0.235)  
Herf3         –0.264 ** –0.337 ** –0.365 ** 0.205 * 
         (0.114)  (0.166)  (0.174)  (0.106)  
SIZEPre-issue         –0.201 * –0.269 * –0.152  0.287  
         (0.115)  (0.164)  (0.204)  (0.196)  
Issue characteristics 
 
               
 
DISC         –0.316 ** –0.321  –0.113 * –0.058  
         (0.160)  (0.254)  (0.064)  (0.039)  
DISC×BUYERController            –0.386 ***   
             (0.093)    
DISC×BUYERInstitution            0.273 *   
             (0.149)    
UNDERStandby           0.314 *** 0.221 * 0.037 ** 
           (0.112)  (0.128)  (0.018)  
UNDERBest         0.382 *** 0.296 *** 0.154 
* 
  
         (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.081)    
UNDERFull           –0.295 ** 0.149 **   
           (0.143)  (0.075)    
AUDIT         0.153  0.134  0.216  0.102  
         (0.121)  (0.109)  (0.173)  (0.085)  
Size of offering        –0.208 *** –0.249 *** 0.328 ** 0.275 ** 
         (0.069)  (0.032)  (0.164)  (0.136)  
FUSETech         0.423 ** 0.435 *** 0.361 ** 0.324 ** 
         (0.184)  (0.159)  (0.177)  (0.153)  
FUSEFixed         0.415 ** 0.354 *** 0.533 ** 0.361 * 
         (0.172)  (0.129)  (0.217)  (0.198)  
FUSEIntra         –0.571 *** –0.514 *** –0.494 ** –0.275 ** 
         (0.195)  (0.177)  (0.251)  (0.133)  
FUSEDWC         –0.527 *** –0.462 ** –0.408 * –0.346 * 
         (0.136)  (0.192)  (0.235)  (0.184)  
ΔDE         –0.216 * –0.236 ** –0.299 ** –0.137 * 
         (0.118)  (0.105)  (0.146)  (0.073)  
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Security–specific characteristics 
TAKEUP         0.341 **       
         (0.157)        
BUYER             –0.311 ***   
             (0.118)    
RATE               0.091 * 
               (0.056)  
Two-stage regression variables  
Volatility –0.253 ** 0.226 *** 0.327  –0.104          
 (0.115)  (0.084)  (0.214)  (0.132)          
Liquidity –0.246 ** –0.291 ** –0.228 ** –0.275 **         
 (0.118)  (0.145)  (0.114)  (0.128)          
CAR–150, –20 0.126  0.329 ** –0.327 *** 0.215          
 (0.084)  (0.138)  (0.111)  (0.146)          
MB –0.314 ** 0.228  0.219 * 0.268 **         
 (0.157)  (0.187)  (0.128)  (0.135)          
Leverage –0.108 * –0.343  –0.288  –0.233          
 (0.631)  (0.245)  (0.241)  (0.189)          
SIZE 0.214  0.286 * 0.298  0.303 **         
 (0.157)  (0.162)  (0.193)  (0.128)          
Managerial –0.229 * –0.268  0.319 *** 0.184          
ownership (0.132)  (0.203)  (0.082)  (0.127)          
Lambda         –0.264  –0.453  –0.243  –0.622  
         (0.163)  (0.298)  (0.172)  (0.460)  
                 
Observations 12,631  12,130  12,234  2640  387  118  259  51  
R2 0.017  0.031  0.012  0.130  0.129  0.143  0.646  0.443  
F 2.191  2.078  2.056  2.158  2.339  1.954  4.298  2.085  
p-value 0.032  0.042  0.044  0.035  0.002  0.020  <0.01  0.0345  
 
Note: 
The table presents results for the two-stage regression where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the 5-day window 
around the issue announcement date, CAR [−2, +2]. The variables for the first-stage regression are defined as follows. VOLAT is a stock’ 
market volatility measured by standard deviation of daily return over the preceding three months on the rolling basis; LIQ is a stock’ market 
liquidity defined as the relative bid–ask spread, which is measured by the dealer’s bid–ask spread divided by the average of the bid–price and 
the ask-price; CAR–150, –20, i, t is abnormal return between –150 and – 20 trading days on the rolling basis; MB is market–to–book ratio measured 
by the sum of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets; LEV is leverage measured by 
total liabilities divided by total assets; SIZE is firm size measured by natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation, adjusted by the 
inflation rate in the corresponding year; and MAN is managerial ownership measured by percentage of outstanding share owned by managers. 
The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We control for year and industry effects using year and 
industry dummy variables in all the regressions.  
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 7 
Regression Results of the Three–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [0, +2]) 
around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
Variable Rights Issues  Open 
Offers 
 Private 
Placements 
 Convertible  
Bond Issues 
 
Pre–issue characteristics 
MBPre-issue –0.293 ** 0.251 ** –0.219 * 0.104 * 
 (0.136)  (0.123)  (0.111)  (0.063)  
FCASTDiverg 0.129 
 0.177  0.154  0.187 * 
 (0.165)  (0.128)  (0.122)  (0.106)  
RUNUP –0.233 ** 0.219 ** 0.192  0.179 ** 
 (0.112)  (0.105)  (0.181)  (0.083)  
DIV 0.115  0.214 * 0.179 * 0.148  
 (0.098)  (0.113)  (0.094)  (0.283)  
Herf3 –0.327 ** –0.226 ** –0.396 ** 0.275 *** 
 (0.161)  (0.103)  (0.185)  (0.108)  
SIZEPre-issue –0.108  –0.205 * 0.141  –0.114  
 (0.126)  (0.120)  (0.192)  (0.098)  
Issue characteristics              
DISC –0.418 ** –0.369 ** –0.139) * –0.272  
 (0.204)  (0.175)  (0.082  (0.179)   
DISC×BUYERController  
   –0.402) ***    
     (0.159     
DISC×BUYERInstitution  
   0.362) **    
     (0.163    
UNDERStandby  
 0.327 ** 0.184) ** 0.219 ** 
   (0.154)  (0.082  (0.111)   
UNDERBest 0.237 
 0.256 ** 0.194) **    
 (0.165)  (0.125)  (0.096     
UNDERFull  
 –0.409 ** 0.283) *    
   (0.207)  (0.173    
Audit 0.192  0.214  0.216)  0.104  
 (0.123)  (0.158)  (0.277  (0.122)  
Size of offering –0.419 ** –0.493 *** 0.238) ** 0.241 ** 
 (0.195)  (0.112)  (0.114  (0.113)  
FUSETech 0.564 
*** 0.602 *** 0.468) *** 0.471 ** 
 (0.214)  (0.227)  (0.145  (0.235)  
FUSEFixed 0.587 
*** 0.613 *** 0.571) *** 0.383 ** 
 (0.205)  (0.202)  (0.119  (0.194)  
FUSEIntra –0.537 *** –0.697 *** –0.548) *** –0.365 ** 
 (0.124)  (0.243)  (0.209  (0.173)  
FUSEDWC –0.541 *** –0.536 ** –0.461) *** –0.427 ** 
 (0.102)  (0.234)  (0.280  (0.211)  
ΔDE –0.248 ** –0.239 ** –0.358) ** –0.186 * 
 (0.126)  (0.115)  (0.173  (0.097)  
Security–specific characteristics        
TAKEUP 0.511 ***        
 (0.102)         
BUYER     –0.467 ***    
     (0.166)    
RATE       (0.158) * 
       0.089  
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Observations  393  124  276  58  
R2 0.125  0.151  0.638  0.494  
F 2.269  1.706  4.141  2.047  
p-value 0.003  0.049  <0.01  0.032  
 
Note: 
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the 3-day window around 
the issue announcement date, CAR[0, +2]. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
We control for year and industry effects using year and industry dummy variables in all the regressions. 
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 8 
Regression Results of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–A1, X0])  
in the Offer Period by Issue Method 
 
Variable Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible Issues 
     
Pre–issue characteristics          
MBpre-issue –0.128  0.147 
** –0.158  0.146  
 (0.159)  (0.062)  (0.108)  (0.138)  
FCASTdiverg –0.213 
* 0.175 * 0.285 * 0.275 ** 
 (0.124)  (0.102)  (0.173)  (0.137)  
RUNUP –0.273 ** 0.253 ** 0.124  0.217 ** 
 (0.124)  (0.119)  (0.111)  (0.104) 
 
4 
 
DIV 0.106  0.172 * 0.283 ** 0.165  
 (0.113)  (0.103)  (0.139)  (0.123)  
Herf3 –0.269 ** –0.205 * –0.327 ** –0.269  
 (0.136)  (0.109)  (0.159)  (0.240)  
SIZEpre-issue –0.238  –0.102 
* –0.257 * 0.148  
 (0.178)  (0.067)  (0.146)  (0.098)  
Issue characteristics              
DISC –0.394 *** –0.207 * –0.160 * –0.174  
 (0.127)  (0.108)  (0.091)  (0.135)   
DISC× BUYERController     –0.215 **    
     (0.087)     
DISC×BUYERInstitution     0.118 **    
     (0.056)    
UNDERStandby   0.169 ** 0.193 * 0.384 ** 
   (0.071)  (0.102)  (0.185)   
UNDERBest 0.183  0.127 * 0.219 **    
 (0.261 ) (0.069)  (0.102)     
UNDERFull   –0.282 * 0.142 *    
   (0.162)  (0.083)    
AUDIT 0.273  0.258  0.114  0.062  
 (0.185)  (0.196)  (0.181)  (0.057)  
Size of offering –0.357 ** –0.336 ** 0.283 ** 0.232 ** 
 (0.168)  (0.159)  (0.121)  (0.114)  
FUSETech 0.524 *** 0.411 ** 0.401 ** 0.438 ** 
 (0.196)  (0.167)  (0.176)  (0.175)  
FUSEFixed 0.491 *** 0.415 ** 0.457 ** 0.505 * 
 (0.183)  (0.171)  (0.206)  (0.292)  
FUSEIntra –0.512 ** –0.431 ** –0.511 *** –0.426 ** 
 (0.253)  (0.213)  (0.162)  (0.214)  
FUSEDWC –0.435 ** –0.402 ** –0.457 *** –0.404 * 
 (0.182)  (0.197)  (0.135)  (0.217)  
ΔDE –0.123 * 0.238 ** 0.247 ** 0.311 * 
 (0.071)  (0.112)  (0.124)  (0.175)  
Security–specific characteristics             
TAKEUP 0.304 ***        
 (0.106)         
BUYER     –0.278 **    
     (0.132)    
RATE       0.107 
       (0.102) 
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Observations 390 135 285 56  
R2 0.134 0.191 0.557 0.241  
F 3.195  1.743 4.602  1.938  
p-value <0.01  0.044 <0.01  0.048  
 
Note: 
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the window 
from the date before the offer period to the offer expiry date, inclusive, CAR[−A1, X0]. The other variables are defined 
in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We control for year and industry effects using year and industry 
dummy variables in all the regressions.  
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and ***  denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Seasoned offerings in China: 1991–2010 
 Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible Bond Issues 
Year No. issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
No. 
issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
No. 
issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
No. 
issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
             
1991                2 124 124                   
1992 2 153 153                      
1993 72 113 75                      
1994 67 79.3 62 1 768 768                   
1995 68 78.9 59                      
1996 51 170 107                                    
1997 122 220 138    1 255 255                
1998 153 239 168 8 414 322                  2 175 175 
1999 119 237 180 5 1102 1240 2 242 242 1 1500 1500 
2000 176 319 230 18 876 745    2 1425 1425 
2001 85 375 300 20 898 772    4 1417 1406 
2002 20 269 232 28 588 532    5 830 800 
2003 25 271 231 17 683 510 1 42.8 42.8 16 1159 800 
2004 23 453 205 11 1452 708 2 1249 1249 12 1742 1225 
2005    5 5576 786 47 1921 600 3 1203 1034 
2006 3 384 219 7 1590 902 123 1599 600 7 627 430 
2007 7 3322 1207 24 2570 782 96 1500 704 10 795 460 
2008 8 1744 1561 34 1695 996 102 2000 829 5 1544 820 
2009 10 1060 559 14 1869 912 123 1743 780 6 777 785.5 
2010 17 7409 1030 9 2776 1000 1 5787 5787 8 10797 1600 
  Data source: GTA database, Guo Tai An Information Technology Company Ltd, 2011. 
  
